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vAbstract 
 
In Chapter 1, I study an infinitely repeated moral hazard problem in which the principal 
privately observes and publicly reports the agent's output, as in Fuchs (2007). The role of 
the agent's private strategies, which depend on the history of his private efforts, is 
examined in providing incentives for the principal to be truthful. I show that in order for 
his effort history to work as an incentive device, the agent has to use a mixed strategy, 
since otherwise his efforts are predictable by the principal and thus, in effect, public 
information. However, hiding the agent's efforts from the principal incurs a non-
negligible efficiency loss, which may, or may not be justified by the efficiency gain from 
the use of the agent's private strategies. Moreover, the agent's optimal strategy is shown 
to be consistent with empirical studies on how employees respond to subjective 
performance evaluations. 
In Chapter 2, we studies an equilibrium model of the labor market with moral hazard in 
which jobs are dynamic contracts, job separations are terminations of optimal dynamic 
contracts, and terminations are used as an incentive device. Transitions from 
unemployment to new jobs are modeled as a process of matching and bargaining. Non-
employed workers make consumption and saving decisions as in a typical growth model, 
but they must also decide whether or not to participate in the labor market. The 
equilibrium of the model is characterized. We then calibrate the model to the U.S. labor 
market to study quantitatively worker turnover, compensation dynamics and distribution. 
We show that the model can generate equilibrium wage dispersions similar to that in the 
data. Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2006) argue that standard search matching models 
 
 vi
can generate only a very small differential between the average wage and the lowest wage 
paid in the labor market. 
11 Repeated Moral Hazard with Private Evaluation: Why the
Agents Mixed Strategies Matter
1.1 Introduction
Subjective performance measures are widely used in practice, as observed by Prender-
gast (1999). For instance, the quality of an analysts research report is subjectively
evaluated by his supervisor. Subjective evaluations are essentially private, therefore
non-veriable by outsiders. Consequently, employers have incentives to underreport
performance measures in order to save on wages. In addition, employees may regard
performance evaluations as either being fair or not.
Adams (1963) was among the rst to suggest that when an employers evaluation
of an employees performance does not match the employees own evaluation, the
employee regards it as being unfair and exerts less e¤ort in the future. The link
between perceived fairness and subsequent performance is conrmed empirically by
Ball, Trevino and Sims (1994). Moreover, Greenberg (1986) shows that an employee
is more likely to regard a positive evaluation as being fair than a negative one.
In short, an employees performance depends on the perceived fairness of his prior
performance evaluation by an employer, which in turn depends on how he evaluates his
own prior performance. Because the employees self-evaluation is essentially private,
it is natural to model this via private strategies.
However, in the standard repeated principal-agent problem, the agents output is
publicly observable to both parties. As a result, no e¢ ciency is lost if we restrict the
agent to public strategies, which only depend on the public history of outputs. This
is true no matter whether the agents output is veriable by outsiders, as in Spear
and Srivastava (1987), or not, as in Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994)[1].
When the agents output is not publicly observable, each party may have private
information about it. By assuming that each party receives a private signal about
the agents output, Macleod (2003) studies optimal static contracting with variable
degrees of signal correlation. He shows that as long as the agents signal is informative
about the principals, the agent can use it to provide incentives for the principal to be
truthful. Specically, the principal is punished for evaluating the agents performance
as being unsatisfactory, if the agent evaluates his own performance otherwise.
I extend Macleod (2003) to the dynamic environment in which the principal pri-
vately observes and publicly reports the agents output, as in Levin (2003) and Fuchs
(2007). Both parties are risk neutral such that total payo¤ is used to measure ef-
ciency. This is a repeated game with private monitoring which lacks a recursive
[1]See Levin (2003) for more details.
2representation, as in Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1991) for repeated games with
public monitoring[2]. The agents private information is the history of his e¤orts and
the principals private information is the history of true outputs. The agents self-
evaluation is dened directly as his e¤ort, instead of the private signal received as in
Macleod (2003).
I rst show that if the agent uses a pure strategy as in Fuchs (2007), his e¤orts are
predictable by the principal and thus, in e¤ect, public information. Therefore, again,
no e¢ ciency is lost if we restrict the agent to public strategies, when it comes to weak
perfect Bayesian equilibria, as dened in Mas-colell, Whinston and Green (1995). To
see this, rst notice that the principal perfectly predicts what the agents e¤ort is in
the rst period, as specied by the agents pure strategy. And, the agents e¤ort in
the second period is predicted as a deterministic function of the reported output and
the agents e¤ort in the rst period, and so on. Hence, the principals belief about the
agents e¤ort history is degenerate, and independent of the history of true outputs.
Moreover, because the principals belief is independent of the history of true outputs,
she reports truthfully only if she is indi¤erent between reporting the low and high
outputs[3].
When it comes to sequential equilibria as considered in this paper, the agents
strategies are most likely to be private. The reason is that di¤erent private e¤ort
histories of the agent generate di¤erent beliefs, therefore di¤erent optimal continuation
strategies. However, given that the agent uses a pure strategy, the set of allocations
attainable by sequential equilibria is shown to be the same as the set of allocations
attainable by weak perfect Bayesian equilibria in which the agent is restricted to
public strategies.
To summarize, the agents use of mixed strategies is necessary for his prior e¤orts
to be private, therefore potentially e¤ective in providing incentives for the principal.
Moreover, I show that by using mixed strategies, the agent is able to provide stronger
incentives in the sense that the principal strictly prefers reporting truthfully.
I consider the optimal perfect public equilibrium as the benchmark case, which
have been partially characterized by Levin (2003) and Fuchs (2007) under the con-
straints such as, the principal reports truthfully, and the agent is indi¤erent between
shirking and exerting e¤ort[4]. I solve for the optimal perfect public equilibrium ex-
[2]Even for repeated games with public monitoring, the recursive representation does not hold if
players use mixed strategies. Also, see Kandori (2002) for an excellent introduction on repeated
games with private monitoring.
[3]Because the principals belief about the agents e¤ort history is independent of the history of
true outputs, truth-reporting basically requires her to take di¤erent actions given the same belief.
This is possible only if each action taken is optimal. Specically, both reporting the low and high
outputs have to be optimal for the principal.
[4]The rst constraint is imposed by both Levin (2003) and Fuchs (2007). In addition, the second
3plicitly without such constraints. Specically, I generalize the method of Radner,
Myerson and Maskin (1986) to derive an upper bound on the maximum total payo¤
attainable by perfect public equilibria. Then, the optimal perfect public equilibrium
attaining the upper bound is constructed, which consists of a static contract, a pure
strategy for the agent, and a non-truth-reporting strategy for the principal.
The optimal contract is static instead of dynamic, which generalizes the static
contract result of Levin (2003) without imposing the constraint that the principal
reports truthfully. Moreover, the agents optimal public strategy is pure instead of
mixed, therefore his e¤orts are predictable by the principal as argued above. Further-
more, the principal does not reveal the low output with probability one. As suggested
by Prendergast (1999), this phenomenon is well documented in empirical studies as
leniency bias, which implies that an supervisor tends to overstate an subordinates
performance. This reects the fact that the low output occurs with positive probabil-
ity, even when the agent exerts e¤ort. In other words, the low output is not a perfect
indicator for shirking.
Moreover, Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) show that it is optimal for the prin-
cipal to observe the agents outputs for more than one period in order to accumulate
more information, before rewarding or punishing the agent. Consequently, when the
principal delays reporting[5], it becomes di¢ cult for the agent to provide incentives
for the principal to be truthful.
In order to focus on how the agent provides incentives for the principal, I also solve
for the optimal perfect public equilibrium, in which the principal reports the agents
output truthfully in each period. It is shown that the agents optimal public strategy
depends only on the reported output in the prior period, rather than the complete
history of reported outputs. Specically, the agent exerts e¤ort with probability one
if the reported output in the prior period is high, and with a probability less than one
otherwise. Moreover, it is shown that no e¢ ciency is lost by requiring the principal
to report the agents output truthfully, as long as the discount factor is larger than
a critical value. Intuitively, given that the principal has incentives to report the
low output in order to save on compensations, the agent punishes the principal for
reporting it by exerting less e¤ort in the next period.
With private strategies, the agent is able to further make the distinction between
the reported low output in a period when he shirked, and the reported low output in
a period when he exerted e¤ort. Apparently, the latter is a better indicator that the
principal lied than the former. However, in order to provide incentives more e¤ectively
one is imposed by Fuchs (2007).
[5]Even though the principal has to report in each period, the reporting delay can be achieved by
reporting a certain output regardless of the true output. See Section 3.3 for an example.
4for the principal by making the distinction as described above, the agent must hide
his e¤orts from the principal by shirking with positive probability. This is the basic
trade-o¤ in this paper.
In order to address this trade-o¤, I consider a class of sequential equilibria in which
the agents strategy depends on the reported output and his e¤ort in the prior period,
and the principal reports the agents output truthfully in each period. Consequently,
the agents strategy can be represented as a nite state automaton[6], and so can the
principals. These are correlated sequential equilibria according to Phelan and Skrzy-
pacz (2008). Notice that the optimal perfect public equilibrium I solved previously
can be treated as a special case.
I show that there is only one static contract consistent with this class of sequential
equilibria[7]. Moreover, given this static contract and the principals truth-reporting
strategy, it can be shown that the agent is always indi¤erent between shirking and
exerting e¤ort. Therefore, in order to construct an equilibrium, I need only make sure
that given the agents strategy, the principal has incentives to be truthful.
I rst consider a subclass of sequential equilibria, in which the principal has in-
centives to report truthfully, regardless of her belief about whether the agent has
shirked or exerted e¤ort. These are belief-free equilibria according to Ely, Hörner and
Olszewski (2005). Within this subclass, the agents optimal strategy is shown to be
public, which implies that the agents e¤ort in the prior period cannot work e¤ectively
as an incentive device.
Then, given a belief-based equilibrium in which the principals incentives depend
non-trivially on her belief about whether the agent has shirked or exerted e¤ort, it
is shown that the agents e¤ort is always "private", in the sense that the principal is
unable to infer it with certainty under any circumstances. In addition, the agents
output always contains the "right" message, in the sense that there exists a xed
threshold such that no matter what happened in the past, the low (high) output
makes the principal believe that the probability of the agent having exerted e¤ort is
less (greater) than this threshold.
I further show that the agents strategy in the optimal belief-free (also public as
shown above) equilibrium, cannot be approximated by a sequence of his strategies in
belief-based equilibria[8]. The reason is that in the optimal belief-free equilibrium,
the principal is indi¤erent between reporting the low and high outputs, instead of
preferring strictly being truthful. Therefore, no matter how small the agents deviation
is from his strategy in the optimal belief-free equilibrium, the principal could lose
[6]Both the set of outputs and the set of e¤orts are nite in this paper.
[7]In the sense that there exists a sequentital equilibrium of this class with respect to the contract.
[8]The agents strategy is a point in the space [0; 1]4 given two possible outputs and two possible
e¤ort levels.
5incentives to be truthful[9].
Furthermore, I show that there exists " > 0 such that in any belief-based equilib-
rium, the principal cannot expect the agent to exert e¤ort with a probability greater
than 1  " under any circumstances. On the contrary, in the optimal belief-free equi-
librium, upon reporting the high output in the prior period, the principal expects
the agent to exert e¤ort with probability one. This is a non-negligible e¢ ciency loss
associated with the need of hiding the agents e¤orts from the principal. Numerical
analysis shows that this e¢ ciency loss may, or may not be justied by the e¢ ciency
gain from using the agents e¤ort in the prior period as an incentive device.
This paper is also related to the literature on the e¢ ciency implications of pri-
vate strategies in repeated games with public monitoring[10]. I consider belief-based
equilibria in an innitely repeated game, instead of belief-based equilibria in nitely
repeated games as in Mailath, Matthews and Sekiguchi (2002), or belief-free equilibria
in innitely repeated games as in Kandori and Obara (2006).
Moreover, the agents optimal strategy is shown to be consistent with empirical
studies, e.g. Greenberg (1986), on how employees respond to subjective performance
evaluations. Specically, conditional on the reported output being low in the prior
period, the agent would exert less e¤ort if he exerted e¤ort, other than shirked, in the
prior period.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 sets up the model. Section
1.3.1 solves for the optimal perfect public equilibria with and without imposing the
constraint that the principal reports truthfully. Section 1.3.2 characterizes correlated
sequential equilibria. In addition, an extension is considered in Section 1.3.3. Finally,
Section 1.4 concludes.
1.2 Setup
Time is indexed by t = 0; 1;   . There are an agent and a principal who are both risk
neutral. From time to time, I refer to the agent as he and the principal as she. The
principal has access to a project demanding the agents e¤ort as input. Given the
agents e¤ort in period t denoted by et 2 E := f0; 1g, his output in period t denoted
by t 2  := fL; Hg with L < H is drawn from a time-invariant distribution
(t = H j et) =
(
q
p
, if
, if
et = 0
et = 1
with 0 < q < p < 1. (1)
[9]See Mailath and Morris (2002) for more information on a related problem.
[10]For the agents point of view, the monitoring is public because he does not receive any private
signal.
6Shirking et = 0 is costless, but exerting e¤ort et = 1 causes a xed cost c > 0 so that
(et) =
(
0
c
, if
, if
et = 0
et = 1
is the agents cost function of e¤ort. Assume
(1  q)L + qH < (1  p)L + pH   c (2)
which implies that the agents e¤ort is productive. The agent maximizes
(1  )E
" 1X
t=
t  (wt   (et))
#
and the principal maximizes
(1  )E
" 1X
t=
t  (t   wt)
#
where  2 (0; 1) is the common discount factor, and wt 2 R is the principals transfer
to the agent in period t[11].
The agents e¤ort is unobservable to the principal. Due to (1), the principal is
unable to infer with certainty whether the agent shirks or exerts e¤ort from his output.
In addition, the agents output is privately observed by the principal.
In each period, the agent either shirks or exerts e¤ort, then the principal reports
(truthfully or not) the output. Hence, the agents action set is E and the principals
action set is 2. The principals action (#; #0) 2 2 implies that she reports # (#0)
when the true output is L (H).
At the beginning of period t, the history of reported outputs #t := (#0;   ; #t 1) 2
t is public information. Besides that, the agent has his private history of e¤orts
et := (e0;   ; et 1) 2 Et and the principal has her private history of true outputs
t := (0;   ; t 1) 2 t. Therefore, the agents complete history is (#t; et) and the
principals complete history is (#t; t).
A contract is a mapping
w :
1[
t=0
t ! R2
as a transfer schedule contingent on public histories. Any contract is enforceable by
a third party[12]. Denote the set of possible contracts by W . The agents behavioral
[11]If wt < 0, the transfer goes from the agent to the principal.
[12]Any contract I construct in this paper is self-enforcing. But it is easier to start with this
assumption.
7e¤ort strategy is a mapping
e :
1[
t=0
 
t  Et! (E)
and the principals behavioral report strategy is a mapping
r :
1[
t=0
 
t t! ()2[13].
Denote the set of the agents possible strategies by SA and the set of the principals
possible strategies by SP . Hence, a strategy prole is denoted by s := (e; r) 2 S :=
SA  SP .
Denote ! j #t 2 W as the continuation contract following public history #t,
e j (#t; et) 2 SA as the agents continuation strategy following his history (#t; et)
and r j (#t; t) 2 SP as the principals continuation strategy following her history
(#t; t). Denote w[#t](#t) as the transfer in period t contingent on reported output
#t following public history #
t, e[#t; et](et) as the probability of the agent with history
(#t; et) exerting e¤ort et[14] in period t, and r[#
t; t; t](#t) as the probability of the
principal with history (#t; t) reporting #t in period t when observing true output t.
Denote UA(s; !) and UP (s; !) as the normalized expected discounted (NED there-
after) payo¤s for the agent and the principal respectively given (continuation) strategy
prole s and (continuation) contract !.
Given strategy prole s, denote '[#t; et; s](t) 2 [0; 1] as the probability assigned
by the agent with history (#t; et) to the principal having private history t (or having
complete history (#t; t)) and [#t; t; s](et) 2 [0; 1] as the probability assigned by
the principal with history (#t; t) to the agent having private history et (or having
complete history (#t; et)). Apparently,X
t
'[#t; et; s](t) = 1 and
X
et
[#t; t; s](et) = 1.
Furthermore, at the beginning of period 0,
'[#0; e0; s](0) = 1 and [#0; 0; s](e0) = 1
where #0, e0 and 0 are empty sets[15]. The agents and principals beliefs evolve as
[13]Or equivalently, (2).
[14]Exerting e¤ort 0 means shirking.
[15]In Section 3.2, I assume that at the beginning of peroid 0, Nature draws the initial states for
the agent and the principal respectively so that each party holds a non-degenerate belief about what
the others initial state is.
8follows,
'[#t+1; et+1; s](t+1) =
'[#t; et; s](t)r[#t; t; t](#t)(t j et)X

t+1 '[#
t; et; s](
t
)r[#t; 
t
; t](#t)(t j et)
(3)
[#t+1; t+1; s](et+1) =
[#t; t; s](et)e[#t; et](et)(t j et)X
et+1
[#t; t; s](et)e[#t; et](et)(t j et)
(4)
respectively. However, the denominator in (3) may be zero (not necessarily) o¤ the
equilibrium path because the full support assumption is not satised. For instance, if
the principals strategy is to report low output L regardless of true output t, then
reported output #t = H as a public signal occurs with probability zero. If (3) is not
well-dened for some (#t+1; et+1), then I dene
'[#t+1; et+1; s](t+1) =
tY
=0
( j e ) (5)
instead. In addition, following (#t+1; et+1), the agents belief is dened by (5) as
well. In words, as long as the agent detects that the principal has deviated from her
strategy r, his belief becomes independent of the principals reports thereafter. Given
any strategy prole s, [#t+1; t+1; s](et+1) is well-dened even o¤the equilibrium path
due to (1), which implies that the agents potential deviations are undetectable to the
principal. It can be shown that ((e; r); ('; )) is consistent, as dened in Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991).
Denition 1.1 A strategy prole (e; r) is a sequential equilibrium (SE) with respect
to w if
e j (#t; et) 2 argmax
e02SA
nX
t
'[#t; et; s](t)UA((e0; r j (#t; t)); w j #t)
o
8#t; et, (6)
r j (#t; t) 2 argmax
r02SP
nX
et
[#t; t; s](et)UP ((e j (#t; et); r0); w j #t)
o
8#t; t, (7)
while ('; ) is dened by (3)-(5).
1.3 Analysis
The agents e¤ort a¤ects the likelihood of the principal observing low (high) output L
(H) so that it can be used to infer whether the principal is being truthful or not. For
instance, when the principal reports low output L, the agent should assign a higher
probability to the principal being truthful if he shirked, than if he exerted e¤ort due to
1 q > 1 p. Therefore, the agents private history of e¤orts et is expected to play an
9active role in providing incentives for the principal to be truthful. However, when the
agent uses a pure strategy as in Fuchs (2007), a payo¤-equivalence exists between a
sequential equilibrium and a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium (WPBE)[16] in which
the agent is restricted to public strategies, as shown in Proposition 1.1. Thus, the
agents private history is not necessarily e¤ective as an incentive device. The reason
is that when the agent uses a pure strategy, his private history is not really "private"
in the sense that the principals belief about it is degenerate.
Proposition 1.1 Suppose that the agent uses a pure strategy. Given contract w,
denote VSE(w) as the set of SE payo¤ pairs, V 1WPBE(w) as the set of WPBE payo¤
pairs, and V 2WPBE(w) as the set of payo¤ pairs attainable by WPBE in which the agent
is restricted to public strategies. Then
VSE(w) = V
1
WPBE(w) = V
2
WPBE(w).
Proof. See Appendix 1.5.1.
I have VSE(w)  V 1WPBE(w) because SE is a renement of WPBE and VSE(w) 
V 1WPBE(w) if the full support assumption is satised, which implies that each partys
potential deviations are undetectable to the other. However, that is not the case in
this paper so that I have to deal with beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path with caution.
Notice that t has the full support on t regardless of the agents strategy due
to q; p 2 (0; 1). So whether the principals history (#t; t) is on the equilibrium path
depends exclusively on her own strategy in the rst t periods. Given public history
#t, if (#t; t) 8t is o¤ the equilibrium path, then (#t; et) 8et is o¤ the equilibrium
path too because otherwise there must exist t such that (#t; t) is on the equilibrium
path. In this case, I can redene the agents continuation strategy as shirking and
the principals continuation strategy as minimizing the NED transfer with respect to
! j #t[17]. This is a SE with respect to ! j #t which generates the minmax NED
payo¤s for the agent and the principal respectively. Therefore, neither party has
incentives to deviate from his/her original strategy to put some weights on his/her
minmax payo¤ with respect to ! j #t. Actually, the agent is unable to bring #t back
on the equilibrium path because the principals strategy in the rst t periods is the
same. If (#t; t) is on the equilibrium path for some t, the common argument applies
because beliefs are well dened by (3) and (4). So each party is able to change his/her
strategy o¤ the equilibrium path without interfering the others incentives on/o¤ the
[16]See Mas-colell, Whinston and Green (1995) for the formal denition of weak perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
[17]Or simply, reporting low output L regardless of real output t if ! j #t is static with wL  wH .
See Denition 2 for the formal denition of static contract.
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equilibrium path. Recursively applying the procedure described from period 1 gives
a payo¤-equivalent SE.
Regarding the second relation, it su¢ ces to show V 1WPBE(w)  V 2WPBE(w). Notice
that the principal with history (#t; t) on the equilibrium path[18] assigns probability
one to the agent having private history et dened recursively as e0 = e(;) and
e+1 = e((#0;   ; # ); (e0;   ; e )) 8 = 0;   ; t  2 (8)
where e is a deterministic function because the agent uses a pure strategy. Then
(#t; et) 8et 6= et is o¤ the equilibrium path. So we can replace e j (#t; et) 8et 6= et
with e j (#t; et) because WPBE does not impose any restrictions on beliefs o¤ the
equilibrium path[19]. Recursively applying the procedure described from period 1
gives a payo¤-equivalent WPBE in which the agent is restricted to public strategies.
Therefore, even the agents strategy in a SE is most likely to depend on his pri-
vate history et because di¤erent private histories give him di¤erent beliefs, therefore
di¤erent optimal continuation strategies. Proposition 1.1 suggests that the agents
private history of e¤orts is not e¤ective in providing incentives for the principal to be
truthful. The reason is that when the agent uses a pure strategy, his private history
is not really "private" in the sense that the principal has a degenerate belief about it
as shown above. So the principal only cares about the agents continuation strategy
following the single private history she believes of the agent having. Furthermore,
because the principals belief is independent of the history of true outputs in (8), she
reports truthfully only if she is indeed indi¤erent between reporting low output L
and reporting high output H as in Fuchs (2007). Moreover, I show in Section 3.2
that the agents use of mixed strategies is able to make the principal strictly prefer
reporting truthfully.
Proposition 1.2 Suppose that (e; r) is a SE with respect to w. Then, there exists a
payo¤-equivalent SE (e0; r0) with respect to w0 such that w0[#t](#t = L)  w0[#t](#t =
H) 8#t.
Proof. See Appendix 1.5.2.
By treating L and H as two public signals the principal has access to, Proposition
1.2 shows that without loss of generality, I can dene either one as the one associated
with the bonus throughout the contract. Again, I have to be careful about the agents
[18]If (#t; t) 8t is o¤ the equilibrium path, the same procedure as described above applies. Notice
that it is a public strategy for the agent to shirk under any circumstances.
[19]I can just assume that the agent with history (#t; et) 8et 6= et has the same belief on the
principals private history, as the agent with history (#t; et):
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beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path dened by (5) instead of (3). Fortunately, (5) is robust
to the nominal change because it is independent of #t+1.
In Section 3.1, I solve for the optimal perfect public equilibria with and without
imposing the constraint that the principal reports truthfully, in which the agents
private history of e¤orts is not used as an incentive device.
1.3.1 Perfect Public Equilibria
Following Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994), I say the agents strategy e is public
if it depends on public history #t but not on his private history et, and the principals
strategy r is public if it depends on public history #t but not on her private history
t. A perfect public equilibrium (PPE) is a SE in which both e and r are public.
Denition 1.2 A contract w is static if w[#t](#t) is independent of #t.
Given static contract w = (wL; wH) 2 R2, denote V (w) as the set of feasible payo¤
pairs. Without loss of generality, assume wL  wH according to Proposition 1.2. The
agents minmax payo¤ is dened by
min
r2[0;1]
max
2e2f0;1g
"
e
1  e
#T "
p 1  p
q 1  q
#"
rH 1  rH
rL 1  rL
#"
wH
wL
#
  ec
and the principals minmax payo¤ is dened by
min
e2[0;1]
max
r2f0;1g2
"
e
1  e
#T "
p 1  p
q 1  q
# "
H
L
#
+
"
rH 1  rH
rL 1  rL
#"
 wH
 wL
#!
where e 2 [0; 1] is the probability of the agent exerting e¤ort, and r = (rL; rH) 2 [0; 1]2
are the probabilities of the principal reporting high output H when true output t
is low and high respectively. If r = (0; 1), then the principal reports truthfully.
Therefore, the minmax payo¤s for the agent and the principal are wL and    wL
respectively. Denote
V (w) := f(UA; UP ) 2 V (w) j UA  wL and UP     wLg
as the set of individually rational payo¤ pairs. Moreover, UA+UP is used to measure
e¢ ciency because both parties are risk neutral.
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Dene a mapping  : 2R
2 ! 2R2 as
(X) =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
(UA; UP )

9UL; UH 2 co(X)[20], e 2 [0; 1] and r 2 [0; 1]2
such that
UA = UA((e; r); w;UL; UH)
UP = UP ((e; r); w;UL; UH)
e 2 argmax
e02[0;1]
UA((e0; r); w;UL; UH)
r 2 argmax
r02[0;1]2
UP ((e; r0); w;UL; UH)
9>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>;
(9)
where
UA((e; r); w;UL; UH)
=
"
e
1  e
#| "
p 1  p
q 1  q
#"
rH 1  rH
rL 1  rL
#"
(1  )wH + UAH
(1  )wL + UAL
#
  e(1  )c
UP ((e; r); w;UL; UH)
=
"
e
1  e
#| "
p 1  p
q 1  q
# "
(1  )H
(1  )L
#
+
"
rH 1  rH
rL 1  rL
#"
 (1  )wH + UPH
 (1  )wL + UPL
#!
so that 1(V (w)) is the set of PPE (with respect to w) payo¤ pairs according to
Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1991).
I derive an upper bound on the total payo¤ attainable by PPE in Proposition 1.3,
then prove that it is the least upper bound by constructing the optimal PPE which
attains it in Theorem 1.1.
Condition 1 (p  q)2(H   L)  (1  q)c[21].
Proposition 1.3 Given a static contract w, denote
U(w) = maxUA + UP s.t. (UA; UP ) 2  1(V (w))
as the maximum total payo¤ attainable by PPE with respect to static contract w.
Then,
U(w)
8><>:
=  , for  2  0; (w)
    1 q
p qc , for  2

(w); 1

[20]co(X) is the convex hull of X which implies that there exists a public randomization device.
However, it is not needed to construct the optimal PPE in Theorem 1.
[21]In Proposition 3 and Proposition 4, I prove that if this condition is violated, there does not exist
any PPE with respect to any contract in which the agent ever exerts e¤ort.
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where
(w) =
max fc; (p  q)(wH   wL)g
max fc; (p  q)(wH   wL)g+ (p  q)2(H   L)  (1  q)c 2 [0; 1].
Proof. See Appendix 1.5.3.
Given static contract w, the blue parallelogram in Figure 1.1a represents V the
set of feasible payo¤ pairs. And the shadowed area represents 1(V ) the set of PPE
(with respect to w) payo¤pairs including (wL;  wL) because the agent shirks and the
principal reports low output L regardless of true output t is a Nash equilibrium in the
stage game. I generalize the method of Radner, Myerson and Maskin (1986) (RMM
thereafter) by considering the fact that any continuation payo¤ pair must Pareto
dominate the minmax payo¤ pair (wL;    wL). Hence, the upper bound derived is
not completely independent of the discount factor as in RMM. That is because the
minmax payo¤ pair imposes a bound on the feasible punishments, which is going to
bind if the discount factor becomes too small, or equivalently, the punishments needed
become too large.
)(V¥G
Uq c-qLw
Lw-q
AU
PU
)( cB -q
)(wb
LH ww -
1
qp
c
-
qcqp
c
LH +-- )()(
2 qq
Shirking Zone
Slope =
))((
1
LHqp qq --
0
Figure 1.1a and 1.1b
In Figure 1.1b, the shirking zone is located between the blue curve of () and
the horizontal axis where there does not exist any PPE with respect to any static
contract in which the agent ever exerts e¤ort. That is the case if either the discount
factor becomes too small, specically less than c
(p q)2(H L)+qc , or wH   wL becomes
too large. As a comparison, recall in the case of the agents output being publicly
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observable, the agent shirks if wH wL is less than cp q and exerts e¤ort otherwise[22].
Therefore, larger wH  wL, higher incentives for the agent to exert e¤ort. But in this
model, the agents incentives to exert e¤ort depend on not only how large wH wL is,
but also on how willing the principal is to be truthful. Unfortunately, the principals
willingness is negatively related to how large she can gain from lying which is also
wH   wL.
I construct the optimal PPE which attains the upper bound   1 q
p qc for the largest
set of discount factor values
h
c
(p q)2(H L)+qc ; 1

in Theorem 1.1. The optimal PPE
features a pure strategy for the agent, and a non-truth-reporting strategy for the
principal.
Theorem 1.1 (The optimal static contract) Dene static contract was wL = 0 and
wH = (p   q)(H   L). Dene an automaton with two states: a cooperation state
C in which e = 1, rL = 1   1  c(p q)2(H L) (1 q)c , rH = 1, and a defection state D
in which e = 0, rL = rH = 0. Let C be the initial state. The transition from C to
D occurs if and only if low output L is reported. But C is inaccessible to D which
implies that as far as D is reached, it prevails forever. Then, this is a PPE with respect
to w which attains the total NED payo¤    1 q
p qc[23] for  2
h
c
(p q)2(H L)+qc ; 1

.
Proof. See Appendix 1.5.4.
The Defection StateThe Cooperation State
1=e
)1,0[ÎLr
1=Hr
0=e
0=Lr
0=Hr
L=J
HL,=JH=J
Figure 1.2
The defection state features the Nash equilibrium in the stage game. At the
cooperation state, the principal is indi¤erent between reporting low output L and
reporting high output H . Hence, rL is chosen to be small enough so that the agent
has incentives to exert e¤ort, but not too small so that the unnecessary punishments
[22]The agent is indi¤erent between shirking and exerting e¤ort if wH   wL = cp q .
[23]As p goes to 1 which implies that shirking is detectable when real output t is low, the rst best
   c is achieved.
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are triggered. As a result, the agent is also indi¤erent between shirking and exerting
e¤ort.
The green dashed interval with slope 1
(p q)(H L) in Figure 1.1b represents the
optimal static contract characterized by wH   wL. It is interesting to observe that
when the discount factor is just slightly larger than c
(p q)2(H L)+qc , the agent exerts
e¤ort even when wH   wL is strictly less than cp q . On the contrary, if the agents
output is publicly observable, the agent never exerts e¤ort if wH   wL < cp q . The
di¤erence is that when the agents output is publicly observable, the agents expected
payo¤ from shirking is (1  q)wL + qwH guaranteed. But in this model, the principal
can punish the agent even further by reporting low output L regardless of true output
t so that the agents expected payo¤ from shirking is wL instead. In some sense, the
principal is able to re the agent[24]. Therefore, as long as the relationship is still
valuable to the agent in the sense that wH   wL is not too small, or specically
(1  p)wL+ pwH > wL[25], the agent has incentives to exert e¤ort in order to stay in.
At the cooperation state, rL 2 [0; 1) and rH = 1 imply that high output t = H
is always rewarded, but low output t = L is not always punished. That is because
the role of reported low output #t = L is two fold: it di¤erentiates the agents
output ex post in order to provide ex ante incentives. But it also serves as the
public signal upon which the agent and the principal can coordinate their future
actions, or specically, their future mutual punishments as described at the defection
state. As far as the e¢ ciency is concerned, it is not optimal to trigger the mutual
punishments more frequently than necessary in terms of providing incentives for the
agent to exert e¤ort. Therefore, it is not surprising to observe that larger the discount
factor, larger the bias measured by rL because when the agent values his future
payo¤more, a smaller probability of triggering the punishments is enough to provide
incentives for the agent. As suggested by Prendergast (1999), this phenomenon is well
documented in empirical studies as leniency bias, which implies that an supervisor
tends to overstate an subordinates performance.
This reects the fact that the principal is unable to observe the agents e¤ort
directly. Otherwise, there is no e¢ ciency loss of threatening to punish the agent
as severely as possible because the punishments will not be mistakenly triggered.
Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) (AMP thereafter) further show that it is optimal
for the principal to observe the agents outputs for more than one period in order to
accumulate more information before rewarding or punishing the agent. For instance,
in the T -period review equilibrium replicated from Fuchs (2007) without referring
[24]This implies allowing the principal to be able to re the agent explicitly in this model may not
be necessary.
[25]This requires wH   wL > cp which is apparently weaker than wH   wL > cp q .
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to termination, the principal reports high output H regardless of true output t for
the rst T   1 periods[26]. Hence, the agent receives a signal informative about the
principals action for every T periods. And the principal has incentives to keep T
as large as possible (T can go to innity as the discount factor goes to one). This
illustrates an informational disadvantage for the agent in the sense that the principal
observes true output t informative about the agents e¤ort every period, but is able
to keep the agent from receiving information about her action frequently. In order
to focus on how the agent provides incentives for the principal, I impose the truth-
reporting constraint upon the principal. So the agent is the only party keeping private
information on the equilibrium path. This is also consistent with the common practice
of employee participation in the performance evaluation process by keeping employees
informed as documented in Cawley, Keeping and Levy (1998).
Also, notice that the agent uses a pure strategy in Theorem 1.1 so that his private
history of e¤orts is actually public, therefore not e¤ective in providing incentives for
the principal to be truthful according to Proposition 1.1. That suggests that making it
private therefore potentially e¤ective may impose restrictions on the agents strategies.
Unlike Macleod (2003) in which the agents self-evaluation, dened as a private signal
received, is private by assumption, keeping the agents self-evaluation dened as his
e¤ort private may come with a e¢ ciency loss.
Consider an example based on Theorem 1.1 to illustrate how the agents use of
mixed strategies is able to generate more information for the agent with a e¢ ciency
loss. Notice the agent at state C observes reported low (high) output #t = L (H)
with probability (1 p)(1 rL) (p+(1 p)rL). This can be the result of the principals
strategy being (rL; 1) as dened in Theorem 1.1 or (p + (1   p)rL; p + (1   p)rL) in
which the principal reports high output H with probability p+ (1  p)rL regardless
of true output t. If it is the latter, the agents optimal strategy is to shirk instead.
Therefore, the agent has incentives to nd out by shirking randomly. If shirking seems
not to a¤ect the probability of the agent receiving reported high output #t = H , it is
more likely that the principals strategy is the latter so that the agent should shirk.
Proposition 1.4 Allowing dynamic contracting does not increase the maximum total
NED payo¤ attainable by PPE.
Proof. See Appendix 1.5.5.
Proposition 1.4 generalizes the static contract result of Levin (2003) without im-
posing the constraint that the principal reports truthfully[27]. It turns out to be easier
[26]See Section 3.3 for details.
[27]But the role of dynamic contracting is unclear when it comes to SE with the agents mixed
strategies. See Fuchs (2007) for a static contract result with the agents pure strategies.
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to derive the set of PPE payo¤ pairs with respect to some dynamic contract directly,
instead of the set of PPE payo¤pairs with respect to a certain dynamic contract. The
way to do that is to imagine that there exists a third player called contract generator,
for instance, besides the agent and the principal. The contract generators action set
is R2. And its strategy is a mapping
w :
1[
t=0
t ! R2.
As a result, the set of PPE payo¤pairs is characterized as an area between two parallel
lines because if (UA; UP ) is in it, then any (eUA; eUP ) with eUA + eUP = UA + UP is in
it too. All we have to do is to add a constant transfer without interfering incentives
for the agent and the principal.
Denition 1.3 The principals report strategy features truth-reporting if the principal
reports truthfully as long as no false reports have been made previously.
It is not necessary to be specic about the principals strategy o¤ the equilibrium
path, because given the principals strategy on the equilibrium path as dened above,
the agent never assigns positive probability to the principal being o¤ the equilibrium
path due to p; q 2 (0; 1).
Lemma 1.1 Suppose that (e; r) is a SE with respect to static contract w = (0; wH).
If the principals report strategy features truth-reporting, then wH = 0 or cp q .
Proof. See Appendix 1.5.6.
The intuition is simple. If the principals strategy features truth-reporting, then
the agent expects to observe any public history with positive probability. So no
matter what the agents history is, he believes with certainty that the principal is on
the equilibrium path, therefore is going to be truthful in the future. Given that, if
wH is strictly less (greater) than cp q , then the agent has a strictly dominant strategy
of shirking (exerting e¤ort). In either case, the principal does not have incentives
to report high output H as long as it is costly with wH > 0, because the agents
continuation strategy is independent of her report. For notational simplication, let
w =

0; c
p q

which is the only static contract I have to consider, when it comes to
SE in which the principal reports truthfully.
Because the e¢ ciency is exclusively determined by the agents e¤ort, it is equiva-
lent to focus on the NED probability of the agent exerting e¤ort dened as
e = (1  )E0
" 1X
t=0
tet
 s
#
2 [0; 1] (10)
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instead of the total NED payo¤. For instance, the total NED payo¤  1 q
p qc attainable
by the optimal PPE is equivalent to the NED probability of the agent exerting e¤ort
(p q)2(H L) (1 q)c
(p q)[(p q)(H L) c] . Furthermore, dene
C 
8><>:e 2 [0; 1]

9a PPE (e; r) with respect to w
such that
(10) and r features truth-reporting
9>=>; (11)
as the set of NED probabilities of the agent exerting e¤ort in PPE with respect to
w in which the principals strategy features truth-reporting.
Theorem 1.2 C is empty for  2

0; c
(p q)2(H L)

[28]. Otherwise,
C =

qc
(p  q)[(p  q)(H   L)  c] ;
(p  q)2(H   L)  (1  q)c
(p  q)[(p  q)(H   L)  c]

.
Furthermore, there exist eL and eH with eL < eH such that
e(#t+1) =
(
eL , if #t = L
eH , if #t = H
8#t+1.
Proof. See Appendix 1.5.7.
In the optimal perfect public equilibrium, I have
eL = 1  1

c
(p  q)2(H   L) and eH = 1.
After observing true output t, the principal with history (#
t; t+1) has to decide
whether it is optimal to choose the NED payo¤ following ((#t; #t = H); 
t+1) over the
one following ((#t; #t = L); 
t+1) by reporting high output H for the cost wH   wL.
When it comes to PPE in which the agent uses public strategies, the history of
true outputs t+1 can be ignored by the principal. I have a similar situation as in
Proposition 1.1 so that the principal has to be indi¤erent between reporting low
output L and reporting high output H . In some sense, the agent is supposed to
"reimburse" the principal for the cost wH   wL by promising to exert more e¤ort
following reported high output H . Because both the agent and the principal are risk
neutral, a rst order Markov strategy as described in Theorem 1.2 can do the trick.
And, the agents tit-for-tat strategy as described above is consistent with empirical
studies, e.g. Greenberg (1986), which show that an employee is more likely to regard
[28]This requires (p  q)2(H   L)  c which is stronger than Condition 1. Otherwise, C is empty
regardless of the discount factor.
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a positive evaluation as being fair than a negative one.
As shown in Figure 1.3, requiring the principal to be truthful does not lower the
maximum NED probability of the agent exerting e¤ort attainable, but it does increase
the threshold on the discount factor value from c
(p q)2(H L)+qc to
c
(p q)2(H L) so that
the punishments needed are not too large to be feasible. This can be treated as a
direct e¢ ciency loss from requiring the principal to reveal her private information to
the agent.
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Figure 1.3
In Section 3.2 below, I deviate from the benchmark in Theorem 1.2 by assuming
that the agents strategy is private, which depends on the reported output and his
e¤ort in the prior period. In this environment, the necessary conditions are char-
acterized under which the agents e¤ort in the prior period is e¤ective in providing
incentives for the principal to be truthful. Then, I identify analytically and mea-
sure numerically the potential e¢ ciency loss and gain. Moreover, the agents optimal
strategy is characterized.
1.3.2 Correlated Sequential Equilibria
In this section, I consider private equilibria in which each players strategy can depend
on ones private information, in addition to the public information. Following Phelan
and Skrzypacz (2008), I conne my attention to a specic type of private equilib-
rium, called correlated sequential equilibrium, in which each players strategy can be
represented as a nite state automaton, and the initial states are drawn from a joint
distribution at the beginning of the game.
Specically, I assume that the probability of the agent exerting e¤ort in period
t + 1 is determined by his history in period t, or equivalently, reported output #t
and his e¤ort et. Hence, the agents strategy can be represented as an automaton
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consisting of a set of states
  =  E = f(L; 0); (L; 1); (H; 0); (H; 1)g,
an e¤ort function
e :  ! [0; 1],
where e() is the probability of the agent exerting e¤ort at state  2  , and a
transition function  :   E !   dened as
(; #; e) = (#; e),
which implies that the agents state switches to (#; e) in period t + 1 if and only if
his history in period t is (#; e), regardless of his state in period t. For notational
simplicity, I refer to e() as e thereafter.
In addition, the principal reports the agents output truthfully in each period.
Therefore, the principals strategy can be represented as an automaton consisting of
a set of states
 =  = fL;Hg,
a report function r : !  dened as
r(; ) = [29],
and a transition function & : !  dened as
&(; #; ) = #,
which implies that the principals state switches to # in period t+1 if and only if she
reports # in period t, regardless of her state in period t. Notice that the principals
strategy is static in the sense that the report function is independent of her state.
Therefore, the certain automaton representation is chosen for technical reasons, which
is in no way unique.
At the beginning of period 0, Nature draws the initial states for the agent and
principal respectively according to a joint distribution,
(L; 0) (L; 1) (H; 0) (H; 1)
L L;0 L;1 0 0
H 0 0 H;0 H;1
[29]This implies that the principal always reports truthfully even o¤ the equilibrium path.
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which is common knowledge. Assume L;0 + L;1 6= 0 and H;0 + H;1 6= 0. The joint
distribution does not have the full support, which is consistent with the fact that, in
period t + 1, the principal at state  assigns probability zero to the agent being at
state (0; 0) and (0; 1) with 0 6= . The reason is that the principal is at state  in
period t + 1 if and only if she reported  in period t, which implies that the agents
history in period t (or equivalently, the agents state in period t + 1) is either (; 0)
or (; 1).
The optimal perfect public equilibrium in Theorem 1.2 can be replicated by letting
eL;0 = eL;1 = 1  1

c
(p  q)2(H   L) and eH;0 = eH;1 = 1
L;0 = L;1 = H;0 = 0 and H;1 = 1.
According to Lemma 1, without loss of generality, the contract is dened as w =
0; c
p q

. Given contract w and the principals truth-reporting strategy as dened
above, the agent is always indi¤erent between shirking and exerting e¤ort. As a
result, any e¤ort function e :   ! [0; 1] is optimal for the agent. Therefore, I focus
on the following question: given the agents e¤ort function e, does the principal have
incentives to be truthful? If the answer is positive, I say that e supports truth-
reporting.
I start with dening how the principals beliefs evolve. Because the agents contin-
uation strategy is exclusively determined by his state, the principals relevant belief is
about the agents state  2  , instead of the agents private history et 2 Et. Speci-
cally, the principals belief at state  2  is about whether the agent is at state (; 0)
or (; 1), or equivalently, whether the agent has exerted e¤ort in previous period (if
there is one).
If the principal at state  assigns probability x 2 [0; 1] to the agent being at state
(; 1) in period t, she expects the agent to exert e¤ort with probability
e(x;) = (1  x)e;0 + xe;1 2 [0; 1] (12)
before observing true output t. However, after observing true output t to be low
and high, the principal assigns probabilities
F (x; L;) =
e(x;)(1  p)
(1  e(x;))(1  q) + e(x;)(1  p) 2 [0; 1] (13)
F (x;H;) =
e(x;)p
(1  e(x;))q + e(x;)p 2 [0; 1] (14)
to the agent having exerted e¤ort in period t respectively. Notice that (13) and (14)
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are well-dened due to q; p 2 (0; 1).
For all  2 , denote N()  [0; 1] as the set of possible probabilities assigned by
the principal at state  to the agent being at state (; 1), before observing the true
output in current period. Hence, x 2 N() if and only if x = ;1
;0+;1
, or there exist
initial state 0 2  and history (#t+1; t+1) for the principal such that
#t =  and x =
X
et+12Et+1 with et=1
[0;#
t+1; t+1](et+1),
which imply that if the principal starts with 0, then following (#
t+1; t+1), she is at
state  in period t+1, and assigns probability x to the agent having exerted e¤ort in
period t, or equivalently, being at state (; 1) in period t+ 1.
Following Phelan and Skrzypacz (2008), I construct N() by dening Nt() recur-
sively with
N() =
1[
t=0
Nt() 8 2  (15)
as follows: if the principal is at state  in period 0, then she assigns probability
;1
;0+;1
to the agent being at state (; 1) such that
N0() =

;1
;0 + ;1

. (16)
Furthermore, Nt+1() is dened recursively as
Nt+1()=(Nt(L);Nt(H);)
=
8><>:x 2 [0; 1]

90 2  and (#; ) 2 2
such that
# =  and x = F (x0; ;0) for some x0 2 Nt(0)
9>=>; (17)
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where  : 2[0;1] 2[0;1]! 2[0;1] is a mapping. The idea is illustrated in Figure 1.4,
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Figure 1.4
in which N1(L) = N1(H) = fA;B;C;Dg. It is no coincidence to have N1(L) = N1(H),
which will be generalized for t + 1 by (a) in Proposition 1.8. The idea is that the
principals belief about whether the agent has shirked or exerted e¤ort in period 0
is independent of reported output #0, because it occurs after the agent makes his
e¤ort decision. However, the principals state in period 1 is exclusively determined
by #0. For instance, if the principals initial state is L, then she assigns probability
A = F

L;1
L;0+L;1
; 0 = L;L

to the agent having exerted e¤ort, after observing true
output 0 to be low. Then, A 2 N1(L) if #0 = L and A 2 N1(H) if #0 = H. The
di¤erence is that A 2 N1(L) is a belief on the equilibrium path, while A 2 N1(H) is
a belief o¤ the equilibrium path because the principal misreported.
Furthermore, for all  2  , denote e 2 [0; 1] as the NED probability of the agent
exerting e¤ort, given the agents continuation strategy at state  and the principals
truth-reporting strategy. Hence, given that the agents starting state is , e measures
how much e¤ort (on average) the principal expects the agent to exert in the future
by reporting truthfully. Formally,
e  (1  )e+ Ze (18)
where
e  (eL;0 eL;1 eH;0 eH;1)>
e  (eL;0 eL;1 eH;0 eH;1)>
24
and
Z 
266664
(1  eL;0)(1  q) eL;0(1  p) (1  eL;0)q eL;0p
(1  eL;1)(1  q) eL;1(1  p) (1  eL;1)q eL;1p
(1  eH;0)(1  q) eH;0(1  p) (1  eH;0)q eH;0p
(1  eH;1)(1  q) eH;1(1  p) (1  eH;1)q eH;1p
377775
is the transition matrix. By algebra, I have
e =
e0
1  (e1   e0) +
1  
1  (e1   e0)

e   e0
1  (e1   e0)

8 2   (19)
where e0 = (1  q)eL;0 + qeH;0 and e1 = (1  p)eL;1 + peH;1[30]. In addition, e01 (e1 e0)
is the long term average independent of the agents starting state, and 1 
1 (e1 e0)
measures how much the agents starting state matters, which goes to zero as the
discount factor goes to one.
Lemma 1.2 An e¤ort function e :   ! [0; 1] supports truth-reporting if and only if
for all  2  and x 2 N(),
(1  F (x; L;))(eH;0   eL;0) + F (x; L;)(eH;1   eL;1)  y (20)
(1  F (x;H;))(eH;0   eL;0) + F (x;H;)(eH;1   eL;1)  y (21)
where
y  1  

c
(p  q)[(p  q)(H   L)  c] > 0[31].
Proof. See Appendix 1.5.8.
According to Theorem 12.2.2 in Mailath and Samuelson (2006), the one-shot devia-
tion principal applies. So, (20) and (21) are basically no protable one-shot deviations
conditions for the principal, given that the true output is low and high respectively.
Given that the agent has shirked (exerted e¤ort), the principal is able to increase
(on average) the probability of the agent exerting e¤ort in the future by eH;0   eL;0
(eH;1   eL;1), if she reports the high output for the cost cp q . However, the principal
does not know for sure whether the agent has shirked or exerted e¤ort. Instead,
she assigns probability F (x;L;) (F (x;H;)) to the agent having exerted e¤ort after
observing the true output to be low (high). Therefore, the left hand side of (20) ((21))
is how much more e¤ort (on average) the principal expects the agent to exert in the
future by reporting the high output in current period, given that the true output
[30]On the equilibrium path, e0 (e1) is the expected probability of the agent exerting e¤ort, given
that the agent shirks (exerts e¤ort) in previous period.
[31]Apparently, the left hand sides of (20) and (21) are between 0 and 1. Therefore, y 2 [0; 1] which
implies   c(p q)[(p q)(H L) c]+c .
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is low (high). It is protable to report the high output if and only if the expected
increase, on the probability of the agent exerting e¤ort in the future, is greater than
y.
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Figure 1.5
If the principal perfectly predicts what the agent is going to do beforehand (e(x;) =
0 or 1), then no matter what the true output turns out to be, she will not update
her prior belief due to q; p 2 (0; 1)[32]. This is what happens when the agent uses a
pure strategy as in Fuchs (2007) according to Proposition 1.1. But if the agent uses
a mixed strategy as in this paper, the true output carries useful information for the
principal to infer whether the agent has shirked or exerted e¤ort. As shown in Figure
1.5, F (x;L;) and F (x;H;) are not equal for e(x;) 2 (0; 1).
Moreover, the principal is always less (more) convinced of the agent having exerted
e¤ort after observing the true output to be low (high), because F (x;L;) (F (x;H;))
is below (above) the 45 degree line. Furthermore, the convexity of F (x;L;) and the
concavity of F (x;H;) in e(x;) imply that the principal relies more heavily on the
true output in current period to infer whether the agent has shirked or exerted e¤ort,
when her history (combined with the agents strategy) tells her less about what the
agent is going to do beforehand, in the sense that e(x;) is away from 0 and 1.
Therefore, the distribution of e(x;) on [0; 1] across the principals possible histories
measures how private the agents e¤orts are to the principal.
Proposition 1.5 Suppose that e is an e¤ort function supporting truth-reporting.
[32]If p = 1 and the principal believes with certainty that the agent is going to exert e¤ort beforehand,
then she knows she was wrong when the true output turns out to be low.
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Then,
eH;0   eL;0  eH;1   eL;1 and eL;1 < eH;1.
Proof. See Appendix 1.5.9.
Intuitively, in order to have incentives to be truthful, the principal must be con-
vinced of being in the situation where it is in her best interest to be truthful. Because
the principal is less (more) convinced of the agent having exerted e¤ort after observ-
ing the true output to be low (high), she must prefer reporting the low (high) output
when the agent has shirked (exerted e¤ort). Hence, I have
eH;0   eL;0  y  eH;1   eL;1. (22)
Then, Proposition 1.5 follows (19) immediately, which predicts that an employee who
has exerted more e¤ort is more sensitive to what ones performance evaluation turns
out to be. Moreover, eL;1 < eH;1 is consistent with empirical studies such as Greenberg
(1986), who shows that an employee is more likely to regard a positive evaluation as
being fair than a negative one.
In order to further characterize the set of the principals beliefs, N(), and conduct
the e¢ ciency analysis, I have to be specic about the starting condition . Formally, I
dene  = , where >  (L;0 L;1 H;0 H;1)> is the stationary distribution dened
by
> = >Z. (23)
In words, Nature starts the game in the way like it has been going on forever. By
algebra, I have
 =

(1  q)(1  e1)
1  (e1   e0)
(1  p)e0
1  (e1   e0)
q(1  e1)
1  (e1   e0)
pe0
1  (e1   e0)

which implies that >e = >e = e0
1 (e1 e0) . Hence, the agents e¤ort functions are
ranked by e0
1 (e1 e0) . Intuitively,
e0
1 (e1 e0) is the unconditional probability of the agent
exerting e¤ort after the game has been going on for many periods, independent of the
agents initial state.
Proposition 1.6 below explores the possibility of providing incentives more e¢ -
ciently (in terms of e0
1 (e1 e0) attainable) for the principal to be truthful, without
having to deal with the principals beliefs explicitly. But the answer is negative.
Following Ely, Hörner and Olszewski (2005), I say e¤ort function e supporting
truth-reporting is belief-free if given e, the principal has incentives to be truthful
regardless of her belief. Hence, when I call e¤ort function e belief-free, it does not
refer to that the agents strategy is belief-free given the principals truth-reporting
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strategy, which is true according to Lemma 1. Instead, I refer to that given e, the
principals truth-reporting strategy is belief-free.
Suppose the principal believes with certainty of the agent having shirked. Then
she reports truthfully if and only if eH;0   eL;0 = y due to (20) and (21). Suppose
the principal believes with certainty of the agent having exerted e¤ort. Then she
reports truthfully if and only if eH;1  eL;1 = y due to (20) and (21). So e supporting
truth-reporting is belief-free if and only if
eH;0   eL;0 = y = eH;1   eL;1
which does not necessarily imply that eL;0 = eL;1 and eH;0 = eH;1 as in perfect public
equilibria.
Proposition 1.6 Suppose that e is the optimal belief-free e¤ort function supporting
truth-reporting. Then,
eL;0 = e

L;1 = 1 
1

c
(p  q)2(H   L) and e

H;0 = e

H;1 = 1
for  2
h
c
(p q)2(H L) ; 1

.
Proof. See Appendix 1.5.10.
Notice that e is identical to the optimal perfect public equilibrium in Theorem
1.2, but with the di¤erent measure for the NED probability of the agent exerting
e¤ort
(p  q)2(H   L)  (1  q) c
(p  q)[(p  q)(H   L)  c ]
[33] (24)
which is smaller due to the di¤erent starting conditions. Specically, the implicit
starting condition in Theorem 1.2 is (0 0 x 1   x)> for some x 2 [0; 1], which is
di¤erent from  in which the agents initial state can be (L; 0) and (L; 1). In order
to conduct the meaningful e¢ ciency analysis, I still use (24) to measure the NED
probability of the agent exerting e¤ort for e[34]. More importantly, Proposition 1.6
suggests that in order to provide incentives more e¢ ciently for the principal to be
truthful, I have to consider belief-based e¤ort functions supporting truth-reporting
with eH;0   eL;0 < eH;1   eL;1 according to Proposition 1.5.
For a belief-based e¤ort function e supporting truth-reporting, (20) and (21) can
[33]As the discount factor goes to one, the di¤erence disappears.
[34]The starting condition does not a¤ect the principals incentives in belief-free equilibria, but it
does in belief-based equilibria I will consider later.
28
be rewritten as
F (x; L;)  F  F (x;H;) 8 2  and x 2 N() (25)
with
F =
y   (eH;0   eL;0)
(eH;1   eL;1)  (eH;0   eL;0) (26)
due to eH;0   eL;0 < eH;1   eL;1. That implies that whenever the principal observes
the true output to be low (high), she assigns a probability lower (higher) than the
threshold value F to the agent having exerted e¤ort. Notice that if the principal is at
state , and assigns probability x to the agent being at state (; 1), then
F (x; L;t)  e(x;t)  F (x;H;t).
Hence, (25) basically requires that the separation to be uniform across the principals
possible histories. Or, in words, no matter what happened in the past, the agents
output sends the "right" message for the principal about whether the agent has shirked
or exerted e¤ort. I show that the uniform separation property as described above
imposes a restriction on the agents e¤ort functions, which causes a non-negligible
e¢ ciency loss.
I rst show in Proposition 1.7 below that the optimal belief-free e¤ort function e
cannot be approximated by a sequence of belief-based e¤ort functions.
Proposition 1.7 There exists " > 0 such that no belief-based e¤ort function support-
ing truth-reporting belongs to the "-neighborhood of e in the space [0; 1]4.
Proof. Appendix 1.5.11.
By treating each e¤ort function as a point in the space [0; 1]4, Proposition 1.7
suggests that e is isolated from the set of belief-based e¤ort functions supporting
truth-reporting. As argued above, for each belief-based e¤ort function supporting
truth-reporting, there exists a threshold such that whenever the principal observes the
true output to be low (high), she is convinced of the agent having exerted e¤ort for
a probability less (greater) than that threshold. But given e, the principal at state
H believes with certainty of the agent having exerted e¤ort, regardless of the true
output because eH;0 = e

H;1 = 1. At the same time, the principal at state L believes of
the agent having exerted e¤ort for probability
eL;0p
(1 eL;0)q+eL;0p =
eL;1p
(1 eL;1)q+eL;1p < 1 even
after observing the true output to be high. Proposition 1.7 follows by realizing that
F is a continuous function.
Therefore, e can not be approximated by a sequence of belief-based e¤ort func-
tions supporting truth-reporting. A related question considered by Mailath and Mor-
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ris (2002) is that under what conditions, a perfect public equilibrium in a repeated
game with public monitoring is a sequential equilibrium in an arbitrarily closed re-
peated game with private monitoring[35]. They require each player to strictly prefer
ones action in the perfect public equilibrium than alternatives. Hence, as long as
the disturbance introduced is uniformly small enough, each player has incentives to
stick to ones strategy in the perfect public equilibrium. Proposition 1.7 addresses a
di¤erent question which is that given the same repeated game with both public and
private monitoring, whether the optimal belief-free e¤ort function (it happens to be
public) can be approximated by a sequence of belief-based e¤ort functions supporting
truth-reporting. Notice that given e, the principal is indi¤erent between reporting
the low and high outputs such that the principals truth-reporting strategy is not
robust to even an arbitrarily small disturbance.
Proposition 1.7 also has an important implication on the e¤ectiveness of numerical
algorithms. Notice the Borel measure of the set of belief-free e¤ort functions support-
ing truth-reporting is zero because eH;0   eL;0 = y = eH;1   eL;1, which implies that
the set is two-dimensional in the four-dimensional space [0; 1]4. Therefore, e, the po-
tential optimal e¤ort function supporting truth-reporting, can not be approximated
by some common numerical algorithms. For instance, consider a common numerical
algorithm as follows: let the interval [0; 1] be discretized as  =

0
N
; 1
N
;   ; N
N
	
where
N  1 is an integer. For each e 2 4, calculate N() by (16) and (17)[36]. Then I
check the principals incentives by (20) and (21). If e supports truth-reporting, calcu-
late e0
1 (e1 e0) . As N goes to innity, I expect the result generated by this numerical
algorithm to converge to the optimal e¤ort function supporting truth-reporting. But
if e is optimal, which happens frequently in my computation, it is impossible to get
close to e no matter how large N becomes.
Now I start to identify the e¢ ciency loss associated with belief-based e¤ort func-
tions. Given F 2 [0; 1], I have
e(x;) 2

qF
p  (p  q)F ;
(1  q)F
(1  p) + (p  q)F

 
(F) 8 2  and x 2 N() (27)
by (25), which implies that the principal expects the agent to exert e¤ort in current
period with a probability greater than qF
p (p q)F and less than
(1 q)F
(1 p)+(p q)F under any
[35]In the sense that the probability of both players receiving the same private signal is arbitrarily
close to one.
[36]It is feasible because we just have to iterate on the two extreme points as shown by Phelan and
Skrzypacz (2008).
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circumstances. Therefore,
(1  F (x; ;))e#;0 + F (x; ;)e#;1 2 
(F) 8 2 , x 2 N() and #;  2 [37]
which implies that the principal expects the agent to exert e¤ort (on average) in
the future for a probability bounded by 
(F), regardless of her history, the reported
output and the true output. The reason is that by (17), F (x; ;) 2 N(#) such that
the principal expects the agent to exert e¤ort for probability
(1  F (x; ;))e#;0 + F (x; ;)e#;1 2 
(F).
due to (27). This is also true in the following periods. However, (20) and (21) require
0 < y  (1  q)F
(1  p) + (p  q)F  
qF
p  (p  q)F ,
or equivalently,
(p  q)[1  (p  q)y]F2 + (p  q)[(2p  1)y   1]F+ p(1  p)y  0. (28)
Otherwise, the principal does not have incentives to report the high output under any
circumstances. Furthermore, (28) implies F 2 F;F with
 (p  q)[(2p  1)y   1] p(p  q)2[(2p  1)y   1]2   4p(1  p)(p  q)[1  (p  q)y]y
2(p  q)[1  (p  q)y]
 (p  q)[(2p  1)y   1] +p(p  q)2[(2p  1)y   1]2   4p(1  p)(p  q)[1  (p  q)y]y
2(p  q)[1  (p  q)y]
as F and F respectively where
(p  q)2[(2p  1)y   1]2   4p(1  p)(p  q)[1  (p  q)y]y  0[38]. (29)
The idea can be clearly illustrated in Figure 1.5. As F goes to 1, 
(F) becomes
smaller due to the convexity of F (x; L;) and the concavity of F (x;H;) in e(x;).
So the potential impact of the principals reported output becomes smaller on the
NED probability of the agent exerting e¤ort in the future, as measured by the length
of 
(F). At some point, it becomes too small to be able to compensate the cost of
reporting the high output for the principal.
As a result, either eH;0 or eH;1 must be less than
(1 q)F
(1 p)+(p q)F < 1, otherwise
[37]It does not necessarily imply e 2 
(F) 8.
[38]Otherwise, there exists no belief-based e¤ort function supporting truth-reporting.
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e(x;H) > (1 q)F
(1 p)+(p q)F 8x 2 [0; 1] which contradicts (27). This features an e¢ ciency
loss when compared to e with eH;0 = e

H;1 = 1. To illustrate how large it can be,
consider an example with q = 0:3, p = 0:7, L = 0, H = 8, c = 1 and  = 0:85.
By calculation, I have (1 q)F
(1 p)+(p q)F
:
= 0:94 which implies that the agent has to lower
the probability of exerting e¤ort at either state (H; 0) or state (H; 1) by at least 6
percents, which turns out to be a quiet underestimate when it comes to computation.
Proposition 1.8 Suppose  = . Then,
(a) Nt+1(L) = Nt+1(H)  Nt+1;
(b) inf N(L) = inf N(H) = inf
1[
t=1
Nt  x and supN(L) = supN(H) = sup
1[
t=1
Nt 
x;
(c) in Lemma 2, it su¢ ces to check (20) and (21) 8 2  and x 2 fx; xg.
Proof. See Appendix 1.5.12.
(a) does not requires  = . It follows the fact that given the principals history
(#t+1; t+1), the principals belief is determined by (#t+1; t) while her state in period
t+ 1 is determined by t. And (b) follows (a) and the fact that the principals initial
belief
;1
;0+;1
2 N0() will not be the extreme point due to  = . The agents e¤ort
is more private, if x is more away from 0 and x is more away from 1. Finally, (c)
follows the convexity of F (x; L;) and the concavity of F (x;H;) in e(x;).
Theorem 1.3 shows that hiding the agents e¤orts from the principal by mixed
strategies incurs a non-negligible e¢ ciency loss.
Theorem 1.3 There exists " > 0 such that if e is a belief-based e¤ort function sup-
porting truth-reporting, then the principal expects the agent to exert e¤ort for a prob-
ability less than 1  " regardless of her history. In addition,
 < x < x < 1   for some  > 0.
Furthermore, if e is strictly more e¢ cient than e, then
eL;0 > eL;1.
Proof. See Appendix 1.5.13.
The rst result follows by setting " = 1   (1 q)F
(1 p)+(p q)F as shown above. It is a
non-negligible e¢ ciency loss in the sense that given the agents optimal belief-free
strategy, the principal expects the agent to exert e¤ort with probability one if the
reported output is high in the prior period. However, given any belief-based strategy
for the agent, the principal can never expect the agent to exert e¤ort for a probability
greater than 1  " under any circumstances.
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In addition,  < x < x < 1    implies that the agents e¤ort has to be private
enough in the sense that the principal is unable to infer it with certainty under any
circumstances. Otherwise, there exist a initial state and a sequence of one-period
histories f(#t; t)g1t=0, along which the principal is going to be convinced at some
point, or eventually with certainty of the agent having shirked or exerted e¤ort.
If eL;0 < eL;1, the sequence of the principals beliefs along history f(#t = L; t =
L)g1t=0 is monotonic and convergent. In other words, no matter what the principals
initial belief x0 is, she will be convinced eventually of the agent having exerted e¤ort for
probability x1, as shown in Figure 1.6a for the case x0 > x1. And if eH;0 < eH;1, the
sequence of the principals beliefs along history f(#t = H; t = H)g1t=0 is monotonic
and convergent too, as shown in Figure 1.6b for the case x0 < x1.
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Figure 1.6a and 1.6b
Furthermore, if eL;0 = 0, the principal is going to be convinced eventually with
certainty of the agent having shirked due to x1 = 0, and if eH;1 = 1, the principal
is going to be convinced eventually with certainty otherwise due to x1 = 1. No
matter the principal is convinced with certainty of one way or another, she reports
truthfully only if she is indeed indi¤erent between reporting the low and high outputs
as shown before. That is why it is important for the agent to keep his e¤ort private
under any circumstances, because the extreme beliefs across the principals possible
histories, x and x, determine the principals incentives to be truthful according to (c)
in Proposition 1.8.
To summarize, in a belief-based e¤ort function supporting truth-reporting, the
agent has to avoid punishing (rewarding) the principal to the full extent by shirking
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(exerting e¤ort) with certainty, as he does in the optimal belief-free (public) e¤ort
function. The reason is that by shirking (exerting e¤ort) with more certainty, the
agent makes his e¤ort more predictable by the principal, therefore less useful in pro-
viding incentives for the principal to be truthful.
Furthermore, Theorem 1.3 shows that the agent responds to the reported low
output more positively with eL;0 > eL;1, if he shirked. This is consistent with empir-
ical studies such as Greenberg who shows that an employee regards a performance
evaluation match his self-evaluation as being fair, and exerts more e¤ort in the future.
Proposition 1.9 below is devoted to measure how private the agents e¤ort is by
calculating x and x, given his e¤ort function.
Proposition 1.9 Suppose that e is an e¤ort function with
eL;0  eL;1, eL;0  eH;0 and eH;0   eL;0  eH;1   eL;1.
Then, (a) x = F (x; L;L) and x = F (x;H;H) if eH;0  eH;1;
(b) x = F (x; L;L) and x = F (x;H;H) if eH;0  eH;1.
Proof. See Appendix 1.5.14.
The only restrictive assumption is eL;0  eH;0, because eL;0  eL;1 is necessary for
belief-based e¤ort functions supporting truth-reporting to be strictly more e¢ cient
than e according to Theorem 1.3, and eH;0   eL;0  eH;1   eL;1 follows Proposition
1.5. Moreover, eL;0  eH;0 simply implies that no matter what the principals belief is,
she expects the agent to exert more e¤ort following the reported high output because
e(x;L) = eL;0 + (eL;1   eL;0)x  eH;0 + (eH;1   eH;0)x = e(x;L) 8x 2 [0; 1]
where eL;1 eL;0  eH;1 eH;0 is implied by eH;0 eL;0  eH;1 eL;1. It makes sense for
three reasons: rst, the agent has to compensate the principal for reporting the high
output in general because it is costly for the principal; second, it is consistent with
empirical studies such as Greenberg (1986) who shows that an employee is more likely
to regard a positive evaluation as being fair than a negative one; third, it is a robust
feature of the optimal e¤ort function supporting truth-reporting in my numerical
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analysis.
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Figure 1.7a and 1.7b
The case (a) in Proposition 1.9 is illustrated in Figure 1.7a. After observing the
true output to be low, the principal assigns a probability ranging from F (x; L;L) to
F (x; L;H) to the agent having exerted e¤ort. And after observing the true output to
be high, the principal assigns a probability ranging from F (x;H;L) to F (x;H;H) to
the agent having exerted e¤ort. Therefore, e supports truth-reporting if
F (x; L;H)  F  F (x;H;L).
Suppose that the principals belief in period 0 is x0, which belongs to [x; x] due
to  = . What is the history along which the principal is able to get more informa-
tion about the agents e¤ort as fast as possible, or equivalent, the principals belief
converges to x or x as fast as possible? The answer is
f(#t = L; t = H); (#t+1 = H; t+1 = L)g for t = 0; 2; 
which features an oscillation o¤ the equilibrium path.
The case (b) in Proposition 1.9 is illustrated in Figure 1.7b. After observing the
true output to be low, the principal assigns a probability ranging from F (x; L;L) to
F (x; L;H) to the agent having exerted e¤ort. And after observing the true output to
be high, the principal assigns a probability ranging from F (x;H;L) to F (x;H;H) to
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the agent having exerted e¤ort. Therefore, e supports truth-reporting if
F (x; L;H)  F  F (x;H;L).
Suppose that the principals belief in period 0 is x0, which belongs to [x; x] due
to  = . What is the history along which the principal is able to get more informa-
tion about the agents e¤ort as fast as possible, or equivalent, the principals belief
converges to x or x as fast as possible? The answer is
f(#t = H; t = H)g1t=0
which features a monotonic convergence on the equilibrium path. However, in order
to reach x, I should add f(L;H); (L;L)g at the end of a very long sequence of (H;H).
Therefore, in some sense, e¤ort function e as in the case (a) reveal more information
to the principal who is engaging on misreporting. That is not consistent with our
goal of providing incentives more e¢ ciently for the principal to be truthful. Lemma
3 provides a partial result about why e¤ort function e, as in the case (a), is not likely
to be optimal. But the argument here provides an intuitive explanation.
Dene
Q()  fx 2 [0; 1] j9 2  and x0 2 N() such that x = F (x0; ;)g  [0; 1] 8 2 
(30)
as the set of possible probabilities assigned by the principal to the agent having exerted
e¤ort, after observing the true output to be . Notice that Q() serves as a bridge
between the agent and the principal in the sense that it is determined by the agents
strategy, and at the same time, it determines whether the principal has incentives to
be truthful.
Apparently, (25) suggests that Q(L) is below and separable from Q(H) in the
space [0; 1]. Theorem 1.4 further shows that the distance between Q(L) and Q(H) is
zero in the optimal belief-based e¤ort function.
Theorem 1.4 Suppose that e+ is the optimal belief-based e¤ort function supporting
truth-reporting. If e+L;0  e+H;0 and e+ is strictly more e¢ cient than e, then
supQ+(L) = F+ = inf Q+(H).
Proof. See Appendix 1.5.15.
It su¢ ces to prove F (x+; L;H) = F+ = F (x+; H;L) in case (a) and F (x+; L;H) =
F+ = F (x+; H;L) in case (b). The distance between Q+(L) and Q+(H) measures
how well the agent is able to keep his e¤ort private. The reason is that the principal
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relies heavily on the output in the current period to infer the agents e¤ort, only
because the agent has been successfully keeping the principal from inferring too much
from her history (along with the agents strategy) about what the agent is going to do
in the current period. Therefore, supQ+(L) < inf Q+(H) implies that the agent keeps
his e¤ort too private to be necessary in terms of providing incentives for the principal
to be truthful. Because keeping the agents e¤ort private involves the e¢ ciency loss,
it is not optimal to overdo it. Specically, if supQ+(L) < inf Q+(H), the agent is able
to exert e¤ort with a slightly larger probability at each state, while still keeping his
e¤ort private enough in terms of providing incentives for the principal to be truthful.
E¤ort functions as case (b) have all the features consistent with empirical studies
on how employees respond to subjective performance evaluations. So Lemma 3 tries
to shed some light on why it is likely to be optimal, by showing that e+H;0  e+H;1 is
likely to bind.
Lemma 1.3 Suppose e+L;0  e+H;0, e+H;0  e+H;1 and e+ is strictly more e¢ cient than
e. Then, if p(1   q)2  q2(1   p)[39], one of the following statements must be true:
(a) e+L;0 = e
+
H;0; (b) e
+
L;1 = 0; (c) e
+
H;0 = e
+
H;1.
Proof. See Appendix 1.5.16.
Finally, I try to measure numerically the e¢ ciency outcome associated with the
agents belief-based e¤ort functions. Given q = 0:01, L = 0, H = 6, c = 2 and
 = 0:65, I have
e+L;0 e
+
L;1 e
+
H;0 e
+
H;1 
+>e+ >e Productive (a) or (b)
p = :78 :113 :108 :976 :976 :361 :430 NO (b)
p = :80 :190 :117 :980 :981 :508 :532 NO (b)
p = :82 :249 :156 :982 :988 :613 :617 NO (b)
p = :84 :340 :139 :988 :988 :701 :688 YES (b)
p = :86 :421 :141 :990 :990 :768 :750 YES (b)
p = :88 :500 :147 :992 :992 :822 :802 YES (b)
[39]It can be easily satised with q < 12 < p.
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Figure 1.8
in which the blue solid line represents +>e+ and the red dashed line represents >e.
Given q, if p becomes larger, the agents e¤ort becomes more informative about the
true output observed by the principal. Hence, the potential e¢ ciency gain is larger as
well by using the agents e¤ort to provide incentives for the principal to be truthful.
Also, F (x; L;) and F (x;H;) become further away from the 45 degree line, as shown
in Figure 1.5, because the true output is more informative for the principal about the
agents e¤ort. Therefore, F can be potentially closer to 1 so that the potential loss
from hiding the agents e¤ort from the principal becomes smaller, as measured by
1  (1 q)F
(1 p)+(p q)F . Both factors contribute to what is shown in Figure 1.8.
I make two assumptions in this section: the agents strategy depends on the one-
period history, and the principal reports truthfully even o¤ the equilibrium path. In
next section, I try to relax them.
1.3.3 Sequential Equilibria
In this section, I consider sequential equilibria in which the principal reports truthfully
on the equilibrium path, without imposing any constraints on the agents strategies.
The contract is w according to Lemma 1. Therefore, the principals belief in period
t has the support Et, which grows over time. However, the agents belief is simple
in the sense that he always assigns probability one to the principal being on the
equilibrium path, therefore being going to be truthful in the future. Hence, the
principals strategy is public and static in the agents point of view even though
she may report untruthfully o¤ the equilibrium path. By Denition 1, the agents
continuation strategy following any possible history (#t; et) is the best response to
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the principals same truth-reporting strategy. By mixing the agents continuation
strategy following (#t; et) with probability [#t; t = #t](et) assigned by the principal
on the equilibrium path, a new SE with respect to w featuring truth-reporting can be
constructed. The reason is that the principal with history (#t; t = #t) has incentives
to be truthful when he believes of the agent using continuation strategy e j (#t; et)
with probability [#t; t = #t](et) 8et. Given that, a partial recursive structure is able
to be established so that a lower and an upper bound on the e¢ ciency attainable are
derived in Proposition 1.10.
Dene a mapping 	 : 2[0;1] ! 2[0;1] as
	(X) 
n
x 2 [0; 1]
9e; eL;0; eL;1; eH;0; eH;1 2 [0; 1] such that (32)-(36).o (31)
where
x = (1  )e+ 
266664
(1  e)(1  q)
e(1  p)
(1  e)q
ep
377775
> 266664
eL;0
eL;1
eH;0
eH;1
377775 (32)
(1  e)(1  q)
(1  e)(1  q) + e(1  p)(eH;0   eL;0) +
e(1  p)
(1  e)(1  q) + e(1  p)(eH;1   eL;1)  y
(33)
(1  e)q
(1  e)q + ep(eH;0   eL;0) +
ep
(1  e)q + ep(eH;1   eL;1)  y (34)
(1  e)(1  q)
(1  e)(1  q) + e(1  p)eL;0 +
e(1  p)
(1  e)(1  q) + e(1  p)eL;1 2 co(X). (35)
(1  e)q
(1  e)q + epeH;0 +
ep
(1  e)q + epeH;1 2 co(X) (36)
8 2
h
c
(p q)2(H L)+[1 (p q)]c ; 1

(the set is chosen so that y 2 [0; 1]). Proposition 1.10
shows that the mapping 	 is able to generate a lower and an upper bound on NED
probability of the agent exerting e¤ort attainable by SE with respect to w in which
the principal reports truthfully.
Proposition 1.10 Suppose that (e; r) is a SE with respect to w in which the prin-
cipals strategy features truth-reporting. Then,
(1  )E0
" 1X
t=0
tet
 s
#
2 	1([0; 1]).
Proof. See Appendix Q.
Theoretically, the same logic applies in any continuation game. And the estimation
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is able to become more and more precise. However, it is not practical. For instance, if
I consider a continuation game starting from period 2, there are 16 instead of 4 NED
probabilities of the agent exerting e¤ort consistent with the number of the agents
possible two-period histories.
Report the low output
Report the high output
Report the high output
No low output has
been reported so far
Otherwise
kTt =
kTt ¹
The real output is low in
period kTTk ,,1)1( ×××+-
Otherwise
Report the low (high)
Output with the probability
d ( d-1 )
Figure 1.9
Furthermore, I replicate the T -period review equilibrium in Fuchs (2007) without
referring to termination as follows: let the agents strategy be to exert e¤ort in period
t if and only if no low output has been reported before[40], and the principals review
strategy be illustrated in Figure 1.9 below where k = 1; 2;    and T is the length of
review phase. Then this is a SE with respect to w if
T (1  p)T 1(p  q)(1  T )
[1  T (1  (1  p)T )](1  ) 
c
(p  q)(H   L)  c [41]. (37)
Notice that only one high output out of T outputs is enough for the principal to
report the high output with probability one in period T . Consequently, the agent o¤
the equilibrium path has stronger incentives to exert e¤ort because the probability
of him having no high output so far is higher. For the same reason, the agent on
the equilibrium path has weakest incentives to exert e¤ort in period T . Hence, it
su¢ ces to check the incentive compatibility constraint for the agent in period T who
has exerted e¤ort for the rst T   1 periods as shown in (37).
[40]The agents strategy is pure and public.
[41]The optimal PPE in Theorem 1 is a special case with T = 1 and the minimum  solving (37).
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Given q = 0:33, p = 0:67, L =  4, H = 8, c = 2 and  2 [0:63; 0:99], I have
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Figure 1.10
in which the red line represents the e¢ ciency attainable by the T -period review equi-
librium, and the blue lines represent the lower and upper bound on the e¢ ciency
attainable by SE in which the principal reports truthfully. The comparison is in-
teresting because in the T -period review equilibrium, the principal is the only party
keeping private information on the equilibrium path, while the agent is the only party
keeping private information on the equilibrium path in SE in which the principal
reports truthfully.
It seems that it is optimal for the principal to keep private information on the
equilibrium path than the agent.
1.4 Conclusion
I have studied an innitely repeated principal-agent problem in which the principal
privately observes and publicly reports the agents output. The role of the agents
private strategies, which depend on the history of his private e¤orts, is examined
in providing incentives for the principal to be truthful. I show that there is a non-
negligible e¢ ciency loss associated with the use of the agents private history as an
incentive device. This e¢ ciency loss may, or may not be justied by the e¢ ciency
gain. Moreover, the agents optimal strategy is shown to be consistent with empirical
studies on how employees respond to subjective performance evaluations.
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1.5 Appendix
1.5.1 Proof of Proposition 1.1
I have VSE(w)  V 1WPBE(w) because SE is a renement of WPBE and V 1WPBE(w) 
V 2WPBE(w). So it su¢ ces to prove VSE(w)  V 1WPBE(w) and V 1WPBE(w)  V 2WPBE(w).
Notice VSE(w)  V 1WPBE(w) follows immediately if the full support assumption is
satised. But unfortunately, that is not the case in this model.
Suppose (e; r) is a WPBE with respect to w in which the agents strategy is
pure. Notice t has the full support regardless of the agents strategy due to q; p 2
(0; 1). Therefore, whether the principals history (#t; t) is on the equilibrium path is
exclusively determined by her own strategy in the rst t periods.
(1) By (4), given a public history #t, the principal with any private history t as-
signs the probability one to the agent having the private history et dened recursively
as e0 = e(;) and
e+1 = e((#0;   ; # ); (e0;   ; e )) 8 = 0;   ; t  2
where e is a deterministic function because the agent uses pure strategy. Therefore,
the agents any possible history (#t; et) with et 6= et is not in the support of the
principals belief at (#t; t) 8t.
(i) Assume (#t; t) 8t is o¤ the equilibrium path. Therefore, (#t; et) 8et is o¤
the equilibrium path too because otherwise there exists t such that (#t; t) is on the
equilibrium path. Let the agent shirks and the principal NED the expected transfer
following #t which form a SE with respect to w j #t. And it generates the minmax
NED payo¤s for both parties. As a result, the agents optimal strategy does not
change because (#t; t) 8t is always o¤ the equilibrium path given the principals
same strategy in the rst t periods. And the principals optimal strategy does not
change either because she does not have incentives to put some weights on her minmax
NED payo¤ in w j #t.
(ii) Assume (#t; t) is on the equilibrium path for t 2 t  t.
Then the agents belief at (#t; et) 8et 6= et is dened by (3) with the same support

t
. So I rst replace the agents continuation strategy following (#t; et) 8et 6= et given
the belief dened by (3). Then I replace the principals continuation strategy following
(#t; t) 8t =2 t with the one following (#t; t) 8t 2 t. Notice the replacement
proposed here does not guarantee the principals continuation strategy following #t is
the same regardless of t because 
t
may not be a singleton set.
Recursively applying (i) or (ii) from the beginning gives a payo¤-equivalent SE
with respect to w in which the agents strategy is pure.
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(2) Replace the agents continuation strategy following (#t; et) 8et 6= et with the
one following (#t; et) because WPBE does not impose any restrictions on beliefs o¤
the equilibrium path. Recursively applying (i) or the replacement proposed here from
the beginning gives a payo¤-equivalent WPBE with respect to w in which the agents
strategy is pure and public.
1.5.2 Proof of Proposition 1.2
Assume w[#t](#t = L) > w[#
t](#t = H) for some #
t.
Throughout the proof, I denote #t, the reported output in period t, by i and j
for i; j 2 fL;Hg with i 6= j. For notational simplication, I denote (#t; i) by hii
and (#t; j) by hji.
Dene the contract w0 by altering the continuation contract w j #t as follows,
w0[#t](i) = w[#
t](j) and w0 j hii = w j hji ,
and the strategy prole s0 = (e0; r0) by altering the continuation strategies e j (#t; et)
and r j (#t; t) as follows,
e0[#t; et](et) = e[#
t; et](et) and e0 j (hii ; et) = e j (hji ; et) for 8et
r0[#t; t; t](i) = r[#
t; t; t](j) and r0 j (hii ; t) = r j (hji ; t) for 8t,
while keeping anything else unchanged. In words, given the public history #t, the
transfer in period t, as well as the continuation contract starting at period t + 1,
contingent on the reported output L(H) in the contract w0 are the same with the
ones contingent on the reported output H(L) in the contract w. In period t following
the public history #t, the agents strategy doesnt change, but the principal reports
L(H) whenever he is supposed to report H(L) according to r. After that, the
continuation strategies are chosen from s by treating the reported output L(H) as
H(L).
I try to show (e0; r0) is a SE with respect to w0. It su¢ ces to show
'[hii ; et+1; s0](t+1) = '[hji ; et+1; s](t+1)
[hii ; t+1; s0](et+1) = [hji ; t+1; s](et+1)
which are both true even when the agents belief is dened by (5), therefore indepen-
dent of the history of reported outputs.
That completes the proof.
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1.5.3 Proof of Proposition 1.3
Dene a function B : [;+1)! R as
B(x)  maxUA + UP s.t. (UA; UP ) 2  ((x)) (38)
where (x)  f(UA; UP ) j UA  wL; UP   wL and UA+UP  xg. I show U(w) 
B1(   c) as follows: notice  1(V (w))  V (w)  (   c) where the rst relation
follows the fact (wL;  wL) is the minmax payo¤ pair and the second relation follows
the fact  c is the maximum total payo¤. Therefore, I have  1(V (w))   (( c))
because   is monotonic therefore U(w)  B( c)   c. By induction, a decreasing
sequence

Bm(   c)  U(w)	1
m=0
can be constructed with B1(   c) as an upper
bound (not necessarily the least upper bound) on U(w).
Lemma 1.4 (a) If (p  q)2(H   L)  (1  q)c,
B(x) =
8>><>>:
x+ (1  ) , for x 2
h
;  + 1 
(p q) max fc; (p  q)(wH   wL)g

x+ (1  )

   1 q
p qc

, for x   + 1 
(p q) max fc; (p  q)(wH   wL)g
;
(b) If (p  q)2(H   L) < (1  q)c, B(x) = x+ (1  ), for x 2 [;+1).
Proof. Rewrite the optimization problem as follows,
max
e;r;UL;UH
"
e
1  e
#| "
p 1  p
q 1  q
# "
(1  )H
(1  )L
#
+
"
rH 1  rH
rL 1  rL
#"
(UAH + U
P
H)
(UAL + U
P
L )
#!
 e(1 )c
subject to
e 2 argmax
e02[0;1]
UA(e0; r j w;UL; UH) (39)
r 2 argmax
r02[0;1]2
UP (e; r0 j w;UL; UH) (40)
UL; UH 2 (x). (41)
I proceed by considering two auxiliary optimization problems: one with the addi-
tional constraint e = 0 and one with the additional constraint e > 0. Therefore, B(x)
can be calculated by comparing the results from these two complementary optimiza-
tion problems.
(1) e = 0.
Its straightforward to show B1(x) = (1  )+ x for UAL +UPL = UAH +UPH = x;
(2) e > 0.
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First notice e > 0 only if
UPH   UPL =
1  

(wH   wL) (42)
(rH   rL)(p  q)[(1  )(wH   wL) + (UAH   UAL )]  (1  )c. (43)
(42) holds because otherwise the principal reports the low/high output regardless of
the true output so that the agent does not have incentives to exert e¤ort. (43) is
derived from (39).
Therefore, I proceed by assuming x    1 

(wH  wL) because, otherwise, (42)
can not hold. Without loss of generality, I assume
UPL =    wL and UPH =    wL +
1  

(wH   wL) (44)
max

UAL + U
P
L ; U
A
H + U
P
H
	
= x. (45)
(i) If UAH + U
P
H = x, I have
UAH = x 

   wL + 1  

(wH   wL)

and UAL 2 [wL; x  (   wL)]
which implies (1   )(wH   wL) + (UAH   UAL ) 2 [0; (x   )]. Therefore, rH > rL
according to (43) which implies
UAH   UAL 
1  
(p  q)(rH   rL)c 
1  

(wH   wL)  1  
(p  q)c 
1  

(wH   wL).
The rst equality always holds since otherwise UAL can be increased without changing
e, rL and rH resulting in a greater value of the objective function. So I can rewrite
the optimization problem as follows,
max
e;rL;rH2[0;1]
"
e
1  e
#| "
p 1  p
q 1  q
# "
(1  )H
(1  )L
#
+
"
rH 1  rH
rL 1  rL
#"
x
y
#!
  e(1  )c
subject to
1  
(p  q)(rH   rL)c 2 [0; x  ]
where
y = x  1  
(p  q)(rH   rL)c.
The constraint set is non-empty if and only if x   + 1 
(p q)c. As a result, the
maximum value is (1  )(   1 q
p qc) + x for e = rH = 1 and rL = 0.
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(ii) If UAL + U
P
L = x, I have
UAH 2

wL; x 

   wL + 1  

(wH   wL)

and UAL = x  (   wL)
which implies (1   )(wH   wL) + (UAH   UAL ) 2 [(1   )(wH   wL)   (x   ); 0].
Therefore, H < L according to (43) which implies
UAH  UAL 
1  
(p  q)(rH   rL)c 
1  

(wH  wL)    1  
(p  q)c 
1  

(wH  wL).
The rst equality always holds since otherwise UAH can be increased without changing
e, rL and rH resulting in a greater value of the objective function. So I can rewrite
the optimization problem as follows,
max
e;rL;rH2[0;1]
"
e
1  e
#| "
p 1  p
q 1  q
# "
(1  )H
(1  )L
#
+
"
rH 1  rH
rL 1  rL
#"
y
x
#!
  e(1  )c
subject to
1  
(p  q)(rH   rL)c 2

1  

(wH   wL)  (x  ); 0

where
y = x+
1  
(p  q)(rH   rL)c.
The constraint set is non-empty if and only if x   + 1 
(p q)c+
1 

(wH   wL). As a
result, the maximum value is (1  )

   1 q
p qc

+ x for e = rL = 1 and rH = 0.
Hence, I conclude B2(x) = (1  )

   1 q
p qc

+ x if x   + 1 
(p q)c.
Therefore,
B(x) =
8><>:
maxfB1(x); B2(x)g , if x   + 1 (p q)c
B1(x) , if otherwise
.
The result follows by algebra.
46
{ }))((,max
)(
1
LH wwqpcqp
--
-
-
+
b
b
q
)(xB
c-q
c-q
q
q
c
qp
q
-
-
-
1
q
Figure 1.11
The function B(x) is illustrated in the gure above. Therefore, as long as B(x)  x
for x =  + 1 
(p q) max fc; (p  q)(wH   wL)g, B1(   c) =    1 qp qc. Otherwise,
B1(   c) = .
This completes the proof.
1.5.4 Proof of Theorem 1.1
Let U i(j) for i 2 fA;Pg and j 2 fC;Dg denote the player is NED payo¤ at state j.
Apparently, I have UA(D) = wL and U
P (D) =    wL. Furthermore,
UA(C) = (1  )(w   c) + [pUA(C) + (1  p)((1  rL)UA(D) + rLUA(C))]
UP (C) = (1  )(   w) + [pUP (C) + (1  p)((1  rL)UP (D) + rLUP (C))]
where w = pwH + (1  p)[(1  rL)wL + rLwH ]. By algebra, I have
UA(C) =
(1  )(w   c) + (1  p)(1  rL)wL
1  p  (1  p)rL
UP (C) =
(1  )(   w) + (1  p)(1  rL)(   wL)
1  p  (1  p)rL
so that
UA(C) + UP (C) =
(1  )(   c) + (1  p)(1  rL)
1  p  (1  p)rL =   
1  q
p  q c
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as claimed.
The incentive compatibility at state D is straightforward. At state C, given the
principals strategy of reporting truthfully, the agents NED payo¤ of shirking and
exerting e¤ort are
(1  )w + [qUA(C) + (1  q)((1  rL)UA(D) + rLUA(C))]
(1  )(w   c) + [pUA(C) + (1  p)((1  rL)UA(D) + rLUA(C))]
respectively which are equal by algebra where w = qwH +(1  q)[(1  rL)wL+ rLwH ].
So its optimal for the agent to exert e¤ort at State C. Also in state C, given the
agents strategy of exerting e¤ort, the expected utilities for the principal to report the
low output and the high output (regardless of the true output) are
 (1  )wL + UP (D) and   (1  )wH + UP (C)
respectively which are equal by algebra. So its optimal for the principal to report
truthfully at state C. And  2
h
c
(p q)2(H L)+qc ; 1

guarantees rL 2 [0; 1].
This completes the proof.
1.5.5 Proof of Proposition 1.4
For x 2 [;+1), 1(x)  f(UA; UP ) j   UA + UP  xg. And dene a mapping
1 : 2
R2 ! 2R2 as
1(X) =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
(UA; UP )

9UL; UH 2 co(X), w 2 R2, e 2 [0; 1] and r 2 [0; 1]2
such that
UA = UA((e; r) j w;UL; UH)
UP = UP ((e; r) j w;UL; UH)
e 2 argmax
e02[0;1]
UA((e0; r) j w;UL; UH)
r 2 argmax
r02[0;1]2
UP ((e; r0) j w;UL; UH)
9>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>;
.
Now, the set of the feasible payo¤ pairs V is dened as
V = f(UA; UP ) j   UA + UP     cg
because the payo¤s are transferable between the agent and the principal. Therefore,
there exists x 2 [;    c] such that
co(11 (V )) = f(UA; UP ) j   UA + UP  xg
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which implies that I can iterate on x instead of the whole set. By applying the
procedure in the proof of Proposition 1.3, I have
x =
8>><>>:
 , for  2

0; c
(p q)2(H L)+qc

   1 q
p qc , for  2
h
c
(p q)2(H L)+qc ; 1
 .
That completes the proof.
1.5.6 Proof of Lemma 1.1
The case of wH = 0 is trivial so that I proceed by assuming wH > 0.
Notice, given any history (#t; et), the agent believes that the history of the true
outputs t is consistent with the history of the reported outputs #t due to p; q 2 (0; 1)
which implies the principals potential deviations are undetectable. That in turn
implies that the agent believes of the principal being going to report truthfully in the
future. Therefore, the agents strictly dominant strategy is shirking if wH < cp q and
exerting e¤ort if wH > cp q . In either case, the principal does not have incentives to
report the high output as long as wH > 0 because the agents continuation strategy
is independent of the principals report. A contradiction.
1.5.7 Proof of Theorem 1.2
By denition, there exists a PPE (e; r) with respect to w 8e 2 C such that r features
truth-reporting and
e = (1  )e+ 
"
e(1  p) + (1  e)(1  q)
ep+ (1  e)q
#T "
eL
eH
#
(46)
where
e# = (1  )E1
" 1X
t=1
t 1et
 s; f#0 = #g
#
2 C 8# 2 .
Regardless of the true output, the principals NED payo¤ following the reported low
output and the reported high output are
[eL(   pwH ) + (1  eL)(   qwH )]
 (1  )wH + [eH(   pwH ) + (1  eH)(   qwH )]
respectively which imply
eH   eL = 1  

c
(p  q)[(p  q)(H   L)  c]  y > 0 (47)
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because, otherwise, the principal strictly prefers reporting the low output or reporting
the high output.
By substituting eH in (46) by (47), I have
e = (1  )e+ eL + [ep+ (1  e)q]y
which implies that given e, the maximum eL denoted by eL is achieved by e = 0.
Therefore,
eL =
1

e  qy
as illustrated in the following gure,
e
Le
]))()[(( cqpqp
qc
LH ---- qq
Figure 1.12
Hence, I conclude e  qc
(p q)[(p q)(H L) c] . Otherwise, eL drops below zero eventually.
By substituting eL in (46) by (47), I have
e = (1  )e+ eH   [e(1  p) + (1  e)(1  q)]y
which implies that given e, the minimum eH denoted by eH is achieved by e = 1.
Therefore,
eH =
1

e+ (1  p)y   1  

which implies e  (p q)2(H L) (1 q)c
(p q)[(p q)(H L) c] . Otherwise, eH rises above one eventually.
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Therefore,
C 

qc
(p  q)[(p  q)(H   L)  c] ;
(p  q)2(H   L)  (1  q)c
(p  q)[(p  q)(H   L)  c]

 [e; e]
if (p   q)2(H   L)  c. Otherwise, C is empty. Notice, if  < c(p q)2(H L) , the
interval above is not large enough to make (47) hold. So I proceed by assuming
otherwise.
In order to complete the proof, it su¢ ces to show there exists a PPE with respect
to w 8e 2 [e; e] such that r features truth-reporting and (46). I solve for e = e; e
while leaving the rest for the readers as follows: for e = e, et = 0 if t = 1 or #t 1 = L
and et = 1
c
(p q)2(H L) otherwise; for e = e, et = 1 if t = 1 or #t 1 = H and
et = 1  1 c(p q)2(H L) otherwise.
1.5.8 Proof of Lemma 1.2
According to Proposition 12.2.2 by Mailath and Samuelson (2006), it su¢ ces to prove
(20) and (21) are no protable one-shot deviations conditions. Notice in general, this
game does not satisfy full support assumption which is required by Proposition 12.2.2.
Fortunately, it will not be a problem for the case under consideration in which the
principal reports truthfully so that (3) is well-dened everywhere.
If the agent is at state  2  , then the principals NED payo¤ from following the
equilibrium truth-reporting strategy is
|()  (1  e)

(1  q)L + q

H   c
p  q

+ e

(1  p)L + p

H   c
p  q

.
Given  2  and x 2 N(), if the true output is low, then the principal assigns
the probability F (x; L;) to the agent having exerted e¤ort. Hence, the principals
NED payo¤ from reporting the high output instead in current period but reporting
truthfully thereafter is
(1  )

  c
p  q

+ [(1  F (x; L;))|(H; 0) + F (x; L;)|(H; 1)]
which is supposed to be lower than the principals NED payo¤ from following the
equilibrium truth-reporting strategy
[(1  F (x; L;))|(L; 0) + F (x; L;)|(L; 1)].
This gives (20). A similar argument gives (21).
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1.5.9 Proof of Proposition 1.5
By algebra, I conclude the belief-updating function F : [0; 1]! [0; 1] has the
following properties:
(a) 0 < F (x; L;) < e(x;) < F (x;H;) < 1 for e(x;) 2 (0; 1);
(b) F (x; L;) = e(x;) = F (x;H;) for e(x;) = 0 or 1;
(c) F (x; L;) and F (x;H;) are monotone and continuous in x;
(d) F (x; L;) is convex in x and F (x;H;) is concave in x.
8 2  and x 2 N(),
(F (x;H;)  F (x; L;))[(eH;1   eL;1)  (eH;0   eL;0)]  0
following (20) and (21). Remember F (x;H;)  F (x; L;) 8 2  and x 2 N() by
(a) and (b).
Suppose there exist  and x 2 N() such that F (x;H;) > F (x; L;). Then
eH;0   eL;0  eH;1   eL;1. Furthermore, if y < eH;0   eL;0, (20) does not hold. If
y > eH;1   eL;1, (21) does not hold. So the result follows.
Suppose F (x;H;) = F (x; L;) 8 2  and x 2 N(). This implies e(x;) = 0
or 1 8 2  and x 2 N() by (a) and (b). If there exist  2  and x 2 N() such
that e(x;) = 0, then F (x; L;) = F (x;H;) = 0 which implies eH;0   eL;0 = y
by (20) and (21). If there exist  2  and x 2 N() such that e(x;) = 1, then
F (x; L;) = F (x;H;) = 1 which implies eH;1 eL;1 = y by (20) and (21). Therefore,
eH;0 eL;0 = y = eH;1 eL;1 if e(x;) = 0 for some  2  and x 2 N() and e(x;) = 1
for some  2  and x 2 N(). This leaves us two cases: (1) suppose e(x;) = 0 8 2 
and x 2 N(). If e(x;) = 0 for  2  and x 2 Nt(), then F (x; ;) = 0 2 Nt+1(L)
and Nt+1(H) by (17). Hence, e(F (x; ;);L) = e(F (x; ;);H) = 0 which implies
eL;0 = eH;0 = 0, and in turn eH;0   eL;0 = 0. This contradicts (20) and (21) given
y > 0; (2) suppose e(x;) = 1 8 2  and x 2 N(). A similar contradiction is
reached.
This completes the proof.
1.5.10 Proof of Proposition 1.6
Following Ely, Hörner and Olszewski (2005), I say the e¤ort function e support-
ing truth-reporting is belief-free if the principal has appropriate incentive to report
truthfully even when she believes with certainty of the agent having either shirked
or exerted e¤ort. Suppose the principal believes of the agent having shirked. She
reports truthfully if and only if eH;0   eL;0 = y due to (20) and (21). Suppose the
principal believes of the agent having exerted e¤ort. She reports truthfully if and only
if eH;1  eL;1 = y due to (20) and (21). So I conclude the e¤ort function e supporting
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truth-reporting is belief-free if and only if eH;0   eL;0 = y = eH;1   eL;1. Hence,
e 2 argmax
eL;0;eL;1;eH;0;eH;1

e0
1  (e1   e0)

subject to
1  
1  (e1   e0)(eH;0   eL;0) = y (48)
1  
1  (e1   e0)(eH;1   eL;1) = y (49)
eL;0; eL;1; eH;0; eH;1 2 [0; 1]. (50)
By (48) and (49), I have eH;0   eL;0 = eH;1   eL;1 > 0. Notice either eH;0 or eH;1
must be one. Otherwise, e0 with e0 = e + minf1   eH;0; 1   eH;1g 8 2   satises
(48)-(50) and is strictly more e¢ cient than e. A contradiction.
Case 1: Suppose eH;0 = 1.
Assume eH;1 < 1 which implies there exists " > 0 such that e
0 = (eL;0 e

L;1 + "
eH;0 e

H;1 + ")
T satisfy (50) with
1  
1  (e01   e00)
(e0H;0   e0L;0) =
1  
1  (e01   e00)
(e0H;1   e0L;1) > y.
Furthermore, there exists  > 0 such that e00 = (e0L;0 +  e
0
L;1 +  e
0
H;0 e
0
H;1)
T satises
(48)-(50) which is strictly more e¢ cient than e. A contradiction. So I conclude
eH;1 = 1 and the result follows.
Case 2: Suppose eH;1 = 1.
Let z  eH;0   eL;0 so that I can rewrite the optimization problem as follows,
feH;0; eH;0   eL;0g 2 argmax
eH;0;t

eH;0   (1  q)z
1  [(p  q)z + (1  eH;0)]

subject to
1  
1  [(p  q)z + (1  eH;0)]z = y (51)
eH;0; eH;0   z 2 [0; 1]. (52)
From (51), I have
(p  q)z + (1  eH;0) = 1

  (1  )z
y
with
deH;0
dz
=
(p  q)2(H   L)
c
 1.
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Inserting it into the objective function gives
1  (1  p)z  
h
1

  (1 )z
y
i
1 
h
1

  (1 )z
y
i
which is increasing in z. Hence, it is optimal to have eH;0 = 1 and z
 = 1

c
(p q)2(H L) .
The result follows immediately.
This completes the proof.
1.5.11 Proof of Proposition 1.7
Since eL < e

H = 1, I have
eLp
(1  eL)q + eLp
< 1 =
eH(1  p)
(1  eH)(1  q) + eH(1  p)
which implies that there exists " > 0 such that for any decision function e 2 B"(e),
F (x;H;L) (e

L + ")p
[1  (eL + ")]q + (eL + ")p
<
(eH   ")(1  p)
[1  (eH   ")](1  q) + (eH   ")(1  p)
 F (x; L;H)
8x 2 [0; 1]. Therefore, for any e 2 B"(e), there does not exist F such that Q(L) and
Q(H) can be separated. The result follows.
1.5.12 Proof of Proposition 1.8
I rst show Nt(L)  Nt(H) 8t  1. Suppose x 2 Nt(L) which implies that 90 2  and
(L; ) 2 2 such that F (x0; ;0) for some x0 2 Nt(0). So for 0 2  and (H; ) 2 2,
I have &(0; H; ) = H and x = F (x0; ;0) for x0 2 Nt(0) which implies x 2 Nt(H).
Therefore, Nt(L)  Nt(H). A similar argument establishes Nt(H)  Nt(L). The
result follows.
Therefore, it su¢ ces to prove inf N1  ;1;0+;1  supN1 8 2  . By (??), I have
L;0 = (1  q)
X
2 
(1  e) and L;1 = (1  p)
X
2 
e
and in turn
L;1
L;0 + L;1
=
(1  p)P2  e
(1  q)P2 (1  e) + (1  p)P2  e
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which implies
L;1
L;0+L;1
goes between
(1  p)P2f(L;0);(L;1)g e
(1  q)P2f(L;0);(L;1)g(1  e) + (1  p)P2f(L;0);(L;1)g e = F

L;1
L;0 + L;1
; L;L

and
(1  p)P2f(H;0);(H;1)g e
(1  q)P2f(H;0);(H;1)g(1  e) + (1  p)P2f(H;0);(H;1)g e
=F

H;1
H;0 + H;1
; L;H

.
A similar argument applies for
H;1
H;0+H;1
.
(b) (Su¢ ciency) Suppose (20) and (21) are satised 8 2  and x 2 fx; xg. Then,
8 2  and x = tx+ (1  t)x for some t 2 [0; 1],
(1  F (x; L;))(eH;0   eL;0) + F (x; L;)(eH;1   eL;1)
= (eH;0   eL;0) + F (x; L;)[(eH;1   eL;1)  (eH;0   eL;0)]
 (eH;0   eL;0) + [tF (x; L;) + (1  t)F (x; L;)][(eH;1   eL;1)  (eH;0   eL;0)]
 y
where the rst inequality follows the facts (1) eH;0  eL;0  eH;1  eL;1; (2) F (x; L;)
is convex in x. And
(1  F (x;H;))(eH;0   eL;0) + F (x;H;)(eH;1   eL;1)
= (eH;0   eL;0) + F (x;H;)[(eH;1   eL;1)  (eH;0   eL;0)]
 (eH;0   eL;0) + [tF (x;H;) + (1  t)F (x;H;)][(eH;1   eL;1)  (eH;0   eL;0)]
 y
where the rst inequality follows the facts (1) eH;0   eL;0  eH;1   eL;1 by Lemma 9;
(2) F (x;H;) is concave in x.
(Necessarily) By denition of x, there exists a sequence
n
xn 2
1[
t=1
Nt
o1
n=1
such that
x = lim
n!1
xn and xn satises (20) and (21). Therefore, by taking n to 1, I conclude x
satises (20) and (21) as well since F (x; ;) is continuous in x. A similar argument
applies for x.
This completes the proof.
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1.5.13 Proof of Theorem 1.3
(a) The existence of " > 0 such that either eH;0 < 1   " or eH;1 < 1   " has been
proven in the paper.
(b) Suppose x = 0. Since x = inf
1[
t=1
Nt, there exists a sequence
n
xn 2
1[
t=1
Nt
o1
n=1
such that lim
n!1
xn = 0. By (17), there exist n 2 , n 2  and x0n 2 Ntn(n) for
some tn  0 such that xn = F (x0n; n;n). Then lim
n!1
F (x0n; n;n) = 0 which implies
eH;0   eL;0 = y by (20) and (21). Since the e¤ort function is belief-based, I have
eH;1   eL;1 6= y which implies F (x; ;) = 0 8 2 ,  2  and x 2 N() by (20) and
(21), or equivalently, F = 0 by (26). A contradiction with F > 0.
Suppose x = 1. Since x = sup
1[
t=1
Nt, there exists a sequence
n
xn 2
1[
t=1
Nt
o1
n=1
such that lim
n!1
xn = 1. By (17), there exist n 2 , n 2  and x0n 2 Ntn(n) for
some tn  0 such that xn = F (x0n; n;n). Then lim
n!1
F (x0n; n;n) = 1 which implies
eH;1   eL;1 = y by (20) and (21). Since the e¤ort function is belief-based, I have
eH;0   eL;0 6= y which implies F (x; ;) = 1 8 2 ,  2  and x 2 N() by (20) and
(21), or equivalently, F = 1 by (26). A contradiction with F < 1.
Since F 2 [F;F], I conclude  < x  x < 1   for some  > 0. I will come back
to prove the second inequality holds strictly in the end.
Suppose eL;0 = 0. If e1 = 1, then
L;1
L;0+L;1
=
H;1
H;0+H;1
= 1 which implies x = 1. A
contradiction. So I proceed by assuming e1 < 1 which implies
L;1
L;0+L;1
;
H;1
H;0+H;1
< 1.
Consider the principal has the initial state L followed by the history f(L;L); (L;L); g
which implies the principal always observes the true output to be low then reports
truthfully. Dene x0 =
L;1
L;0+L;1
< 1 and xt+1 = F (xt; L;L). Hence, fxtg1t=0 is a
decreasing sequence because xt+1 = F (xt; L;L)  e(xt;L)  xt where the second
inequality follows the fact eL;0 = 0. Without loss of generality, assume eL;1 > 0 which
implies 0 < xt+1 < xt if xt > 0. Therefore, lim
t!1
xt = 0 which implies x = 0. A
contradiction.
Suppose eH;1 = 1. If e0 = 0, then
L;1
L;0+L;1
=
H;1
H;0+H;1
= 0 which implies x = 0. A
contradiction. So I proceed by assuming e0 > 0 which implies
L;1
L;0+L;1
;
H;1
H;0+H;1
> 0.
Consider the principal has the initial stateH followed by the history f(H;H); (H;H); 
g which implies the principal always observes the true output to be high then reports
truthfully. Dene x0 =
H;1
H;0+H;1
> 0 and xt+1 = F (xt; H;H). Hence, fxtg1t=0 is an
increasing sequence because xt+1 = F (xt; H;H)  e(xt;H)  xt where the second
inequality follows the fact eH;1 = 1. Without loss of generality, assume eH;0 < 1 which
implies 1 > xt+1 > xt if xt < 1. Furthermore, lim
t!1
xt = 1 which implies x = 1. A
contradiction.
Suppose x = x. This implies
L;1
L;0+L;1
=
H;1
H;0+H;1
and equivalently (1 p)e0
(1 q)(1 e1)+(1 p)e0 =
pe0
q(1 e1)+pe0 . The equality holds only if e0 = 0 which implies eL;0 = 0 or e1 = 1 which
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implies eH;1 = 1. A contradiction
(c) Consider an auxiliary optimization problem by imposing eL;0  eL;1 as follows
max
eL;0;eL;1;eH;0;eH;1

e0
1  (e1   e0)

subject to
1  
1  (e1   e0)(eH;0   eL;0)  y (53)
1  
1  (e1   e0)(eH;1   eL;1)  y (54)
eL;0  eL;1 (55)
eL;0; eL;1; eH;0; eH;1 2 [0; 1]. (56)
Step 1: eH;1 = 1.
I have eH;1 > eL;1  eL;0 where the rst inequality follows (54) and the second
follows (55). Furthermore, (53) and (54) imply eH;1 eL;1  eH;0 eL;0. So I conclude
eH;1  eH;0. Hence, if eH;1 < 1, e0 with e0 = e + (1  eH;1) 8 2   satises (53)-(56)
which is strictly more e¢ cient.
Step 2: eL;0 = eH;0  eL;1 or eL;0 = eL;1  eH;0.
If e0  eL;1, then e0 = (e0 eL;1 e0 eH;1) satises (53)-(56) and is as e¢ cient as e. If
e0 > eL;1, then e0 = (eL;1 eL;1
e0 (1 q)eL;1
q
eH;1) satises (53)-(56) and is as e¢ cient as
e. Hence, without loss of generality, I focus on these two cases thereafter.
Step 3: Suppose eL;0 = eH;0  e0  eL;1.
Notice (53) is satised automatically. Rewrite the optimization problem as follows,
max
e0;eL;1

e0
1  [(1  p)eL;1 + p  e0]

subject to
1  
1  [(1  p)eL;1 + p  e0] (1  eL;1)  y (57)
e0  eL;1 (58)
e0; eL;1 2 [0; 1]. (59)
Since the left hand side of (57) is decreasing in eL;1, then (58) must bind. Hence, I
have
e0 = (1  p)eL;1 + p 

1

  (1  )(1  eL;1)
y

with
de0
deL;1
 0.
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Inserting it into the objective function gives
(1  p)eL;1 + p 
h
1

  (1 )(1 eL;1)
y
i
1 
h
1

  (1 )(1 eL;1)
y
i
which is decreasing in eL;1. Hence, (57) must bind which degenerates into the case
considered in Step 4.
Step 4: Suppose eL;0 = eL;1  eL  eH;0.
Rewrite the optimization problem as follows,
max
eL;eH;0

(1  q)eL + qeH;0
1  [p  qeH;0   (p  q)eL]

subject to
1  
1  [p  qeH;0   (p  q)eL] (eH;0   eL)  y (60)
1  
1  [p  qeH;0   (p  q)eL] (1  eL)  y (61)
eL  eH;0 (62)
eL; eH;0 2 [0; 1]. (63)
Notice (1) the left hand side of (60) is increasing in eH;0 and decreasing in eL; (2)
the left hand side of (61) is decreasing in both eH;0 and eL. Furthermore, eL =
1

c
(p q)2(H L) and eH;0 = 1 make both (60) and (61) bind. So I conclude (61) binds,
but (60) does not. Hence,
p  qeH;0   (p  q)eL = 1

  (1  )(1  eL)
y
with
deL
deH;0
 0.
Inserting it into the objective function gives
p+ (1  p)eL  
h
1

  (1 )(1 eL)
y
i
1 
h
1

  (1 )(1 eL)
y
i
which is decreasing in eL. Then it is optimal to have eL = 1
c
(p q)2(H L) and eH;0 = 1.
So I conclude that there does not exist a decision function supporting truth-
reporting which features eL;0  eL;1 and is strictly more e¢ cient than e.
This completes the proof.
58
1.5.14 Proof of Proposition 1.9
By Proposition 1.8, I have
Nt+1 = (Nt) 
8><>:x 2 [0; 1]

9 2  and  2 
such that
x = F (x0; ;) for some x0 2 Nt
9>=>; 8t  1.
Given N0(L) and N0(H) are singletons, N1 is nite because both  and  are nite.
By induction, I conclude Nt is nite for t  1. Let xt  minNt and xt  maxNt for
t  1. I have
xt+1 = minF (x; ;) s.t. x 2 fxt; xtg,  2  and  2  (64)
xt+1 = maxF (x; ;) s.t. x 2 fxt; xtg,  2  and  2  (65)
because F (x; ;) is monotone in x. By denition, there exist  2  and  2  such
that x1 = F

;1
;0+;1
; ;

. Given x1  ;1;0+;1  x1 as shown in Proposition 1.8,
either F (x1; ;) or F (x1; ;) must be less than x1 because F (x; ;) is monotone
in x. Hence, x2  x1. Similarly, there exist  2  and  2  such that x1 =
F

;1
;0+;1
; ;

. Given x1  ;1;0+;1  x1 as shown in Proposition 1.8, either
F (x1; ;) or F (x1; ;) must be greater than x1 because F (x; ;) is monotone in
x. Hence, x2  x1. By induction, I conclude fxtg1t=1 is a decreasing sequence with
lim
t!1
xt = x and fxtg1t=1 is an increasing sequence with lim
t!1
xt = x.
By taking t to 1 in (64) and (65), I have
x = minF (x; ;) s.t. x 2 fx; xg,  2  and  2 
x = maxF (x; ;) s.t. x 2 fx; xg,  2  and  2 
because F (x; ;) is continuous in x. Furthermore, given F (x; L;)  F (x;H;), the
results follow.
I have
e(x;L) = eL;0 + (eL;1   eL;0)x  eH;0 + (eH;1   eH;0)x = e(x;H) 8x 2 [0; 1]
because eL;0  eH;0 and eL;1   eL;0  eH;1   eH;0 implied by eH;0   eL;0  eH;1   eL;1.
Hence,
F (x; ;L)  F (x; ;H) 8x 2 [0; 1] and  2 .
which implies
x = minF (x; L;L)s:t:x 2 fx; xg
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x = maxF (x;H;H)s:t:x 2 fx; xg.
Furthermore, since eL;0  eL;1 and x  x, I have e(x;L)  e(x;L) which implies
F (x; L;L)  F (x; L;L). So x = F (x; L;L). (a) If eH;0  eH;1, then e(x;H)  e(x;H)
which implies F (x;H;H)  F (x;H;H). So x = F (x;H;H); (b) If eH;0  eH;1, then
e(x;H)  e(x;H) which implies F (x;H;H)  F (x;H;H). So x = F (x;H;H).
1.5.15 Proof of Theorem 1.4
I proceed by considering one case with e+H;0  e+H;1 and one case with e+H;0  e+H;1.
Case 1: Suppose e+H;0  e+H;1. Hence,
e+ 2 argmax
eL;0;eL;1;eH;0;eH;1

e0
1  (e1   e0)

subject to
(1 F (x; L;))(eH;0 eL;0)+F (x; L;)(eH;1 eL;1)  y 8 2  and x 2 fx; xg (66)
(1 F (x;H;))(eH;0 eL;0)+F (x;H;)(eH;1 eL;1)  y 8 2  and x 2 fx; xg (67)
eL;0  eL;1 (68)
eL;0  eH;0 (69)
eH;0  eH;1 (70)
eH;0   eL;0  eH;1   eL;1 (71)
eL;0; eL;1; eH;0; eH;1 2 [0; 1] (72)
where fx; xg solve
x = F (x; L;L) (73)
x = F (x;H;H). (74)
Notice (66) and (67) are no protable one-shot deviations conditions as usual, (68)
follows Theorem 1.3, (69) follows e+L;0  e+H;0, (70) is imposed by assumption and
(71) follows Proposition 1.5. Furthermore, given (68)-(71), (73) and (74) follow (b)
in Proposition 1.9.
Step 1: Since e+ is strictly more e¢ cient than the optimal belief-free decision
function e, (71) does not bind which implies (66) and (67) can be rewritten as
F (x; L;)  F  F (x;H;) 8 2  and x 2 fx; xg. (75)
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Furthermore, I have
F (x; L;H)  F (x; L;H)  F (x; L;L)  F (x; L;L)
F (x;H;L)  F (x;H;L)  F (x;H;H)  F (x;H;H)
by (??)-(71) and x  x. So (75) can be further simplied as
F (x; L;H)  F  F (x;H;L). (76)
Notice Theorem 1.4 follows if both constraints in (76) bind.
Step 2: F (x+; L;H) = F+.
I show
P
2 
de(x;L)
de

e+
> 0 which implies
P
2 
dF (x;H;L)
de

e+
> 0 because F (x;H;L)
is strictly increasing in e(x;L).
Therefore, a contradiction can constructed if F (x+; L;H) < F+  F (x+; H;L) as
follows: there exists " > 0 such that e0 with e0 = e
+
 + " 8 2   satises (68)-(72)
because e+L;1  e+L;0  e+H;0  e+H;1 < 1 by (68)-(70). Additionally,
F (x0; L;H) < F0 = F+  F (x+; H;L) < F (x0; H;L)
which implies e0 supports truth-reporting and is strictly more e¢ cient than e+.
Rewrite (73) and (74) as
(p  q)e(x;L)e(x;H) + qe(x;L) + (qeL;0   peL;1)e(x;H)  qeL;0 = 0 (77)
(p  q)(e(x;H))2 + [(qeH;0   peH;1) + q]e(x;H)  qeH;0 = 0. (78)
Totally di¤erentiating (77) and (78) gives
A
"
de(x;L)
de(x;H)
#
=
"
q(1  e(x;H)) pe(x;H) 0 0
0 0 q(1  e(x;H)) pe(x;H)
#266664
deL;0
deL;1
deH;0
deH;1
377775 (79)
where
A =
"
(p  q)e(x;H) + q (p  q)e(x;L) + (qeL;0   peL;1)
0 2(p  q)e(x;H) + (qeH;0   peH;1) + q
#
.
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Let deL;0 = deL;1 = deH;0 = deH;1 = " > 0. By (79), I have
A
"
de(x;L)
de(x;H)
#
=
"
q(1  e(x;H)) + pe(x;H)
q(1  e(x;H)) + pe(x;H)
#
" (80)
which implies
de(x;L)je+ =
A22   A12
A11A22
[q(1  e(x;H)) + pe(x;H)]"

e+
.
Furthermore,
A11je+ = (p  q)e(x+;H) + q > 0
A22je+ = 2(p  q)e(x+;H) + (qe+H;0   pe+H;1) + q = (p  q)e(x+;H) +
qe+H;0
e(x+;H)
> 0
by (78) and
A22   A12je+
=2(p  q)e(x+;H) + (qe+H;0   pe+H;1) + q   (p  q)e(x+;L)  (qe+L;0   pe+L;1)
> (p  q)e(x+;H) + (qe+H;0   pe+H;1) + q   (qe+L;0   pe+L;1)
=
qe+H;0
e(x+;H)
  (qe+L;0   pe+L;1)
 q(e+H;0   e+L;0) + pe+L;1  0
where the rst inequality follows
e(x+;L) = e+L;0 + (e
+
L;1   e+L;0)x+ < e+H;0 + (e+H;1   e+H;0)x+ = e(x+;H)
because e+L;0  e+H;0 by (69) and e+L;1   e+L;0 < e+H;1   e+H;0 by the fact e+ is belief-
based and x+ 2 (0; 1) by Proposition 11, the second equality follows (78), the second
inequality follows e(x+;H)  1, the last inequality follows (69).
So de(x;L)je+ > 0 for deL;0 = deL;1 = deH;0 = deH;1 = " > 0 which impliesP
2 
de(x;L)
de

e+
> 0.
Step 3: If F+ < F (x+; H;L), then e+H;0 = e
+
H;1 which will be considered in Case
2 below.
I show dF
deL;1
  1 p
p
dF
deH;1

e+
> 0 (by algebra) and de(x;H)
deL;1
  1 p
p
de(x;H)
deH;1

e+
< 0. There-
fore, a contradiction can be constructed if F+ < F (x+; H;L) and e+H;0 < e
+
H;1 as
follows: there exists " > 0 such that e0 =

e+L;0 e
+
L;1 + " e
+
H;0 e
+
H;1   1 pp "

satises
(68)-(72) because (68) does not bind at e+ by Proposition 11 and (71) does not bind
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at e+ by assumption. Additionally,
F (x0; L;H) < F (x+; L;H) = F+ < F0 < F (x0; H;L)
which implies e0 supports truth-reporting and is as e¢ cient as e+ because e00 = e
+
0 and
e01 = e
+
1 by construction. But since both constraints have been relaxed, a strictly more
e¢ cient decision function supporting truth-reporting can be constructed accordingly.
Let deL;0 = deH;0 = 0, deL;1 = " and deH;1 =  1 pp " for " > 0. By (79), I have
A
"
de(x;L)
de(x;H)
#
=
"
pe(x;H)
 (1  p)e(x;H)
#
" (81)
which implies
de(x;H)je+ =  
(1  p)e(x;H)
A22
"

e+
< 0
because A22je+ > 0 as proven in Step 2.
Case 2: Suppose e+H;0  e+H;1. Hence,
e+ 2 argmax
eL;0;eL;1;eH;0;eH;1

e0
1  (e1   e0)

subject to
(1 F (x; L;))(eH;0 eL;0)+F (x; L;)(eH;1 eL;1)  y 8 2  and x 2 fx; xg (82)
(1 F (x;H;))(eH;0 eL;0)+F (x;H;)(eH;1 eL;1)  y 8 2  and x 2 fx; xg (83)
eL;0  eL;1 (84)
eL;0  eH;0 (85)
eH;0  eH;1 (86)
eH;0   eL;0  eH;1   eL;1 (87)
eL;0; eL;1; eH;0; eH;1 2 [0; 1] (88)
where fx; xg solve
x = F (x; L;L) (89)
x = F (x;H;H). (90)
Notice (82) and (83) are no protable one-shot deviations conditions as usual, (84)
follows Theorem 1.3, (85) follows e+L;0  e+H;0, (86) is imposed by assumption and
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(87) follows Proposition 1.5. Furthermore, given (84)-(87), (89) and (90) follow (a)
in Proposition 1.9.
Step 1: Since e+ is strictly more e¢ cient than the optimal belief-free decision
function e, (87) does not bind which implies (82) and (83) can be rewritten as
F (x; L;)  F  F (x;H;) 8 2  and x 2 fx; xg. (91)
Furthermore, I have
F (x; L;H)  F (x; L;L) and F (x; L;H)  F (x; L;H)  F (x; L;L)
F (x;H;L)  F (x;H;H) and F (x;H;L)  F (x;H;L)  F (x;H;H)
by (84)-(87) and x  x. So (91) can be further simplied as
F (x; L;H)  F  F (x;H;L). (92)
Notice Proposition 13 follows if both constraints in (92) bind.
Step 2: F (x+; L;H) = F+.
I show
P
2 
de(x;L)
de

e+
> 0 which implies
P
2 
dF (x;H;L)
de

e+
> 0 because F (x;H;L)
is strictly increasing in e(x;L). Therefore, a contradiction can be constructed if
F (x+; L;H) < F+ as follows: there exists " > 0 such that e0 with e0 = e
+
 + "
8 2   satises (84)-(88). (Here, I implicitly assume e+H;0 < 1. Otherwise, I have
e+H;0 = 1 > e
+
H;1 so that e
0 = (e+L;0 e
+
L;1+ " e
+
H;0 e
+
H;1+ ") for some " > 0 works similarly
because I can show dF
deL;1
+ dF
deH;1

e+
< 0 and de(x;L)
deL;1
+ de(x;L)
deH;1

e+
> 0 which are left for
the readers.) Additionally,
F (x0; L;H) < F0 = F+  F (x+; H;L) < F (x0; H;L)
which implies e0 supports truth-reporting and is strictly more e¢ cient than e+.
Rewrite (89) and (90) as
(p  q)e(x;L)e(x;H) + qe(x;L) + (qeL;0   peL;1)e(x;H)  qeL;0 = 0 (93)
 (p q)e(x;L)e(x;H)+[(1 q)eH;0 (1 p)eH;1]e(x;L)+(1 q)e(x;H) (1 q)eH;0 = 0.
(94)
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Totally di¤erentiating (93) and (94) gives
A
"
de(x;L)
de(x;H)
#
=
"
q(1  e(x;H)) pe(x;H) 0 0
0 0 (1  q)(1  e(x;L)) (1  p)e(x;L)
#266664
deL;0
deL;1
deH;0
deH;1
377775
(95)
where
A =
"
(p  q)e(x;H) + q (p  q)e(x;L) + (qeL;0   peL;1)
 (p  q)e(x;H) + [(1  q)eH;0   (1  p)eH;1]  (p  q)e(x;L) + (1  q)
#
.
Let deL;0 = deL;1 = deH;0 = deH;1 = " > 0. By (95), I have
A
"
de(x;L)
de(x;H)
#
=
"
(p  q)e(x;H) + q
 (p  q)e(x;L) + (1  q)
#
" (96)
which implies
de(x;L)je+
=
[ (p  q)e(x;L) + (1  q)][(p  q)e(x;H) + q   (p  q)e(x;L)  (qeL;0   peL;1)]
kAk "

e+
where the numerator evaluated at e+ is strictly positive given e(x+;L) < e(x+;H) so
that it su¢ ces to show kAkje+ > 0. Furthermore, I have
A11je+ ; A12je+ ; A22je+ > 0, A21je+  0, A11je+ > A12je+ and A22je+ > A21je+
so that kAkje+ = A11je+ A22je+   A12je+ A21je+ > 0.
Step 3: F+ = F (x+; H;L).
I show dF
deL;1
  1 p
p
dF
deH;1

e+
> 0 (by algebra) and de(x;H)
deL;1
  1 p
p
de(x;H)
deH;1

e+
< 0. There-
fore, a contradiction can be constructed if F+ < F (x+; H;L) as follows: there exists
" > 0 such that e0 =

e+L;0 e
+
L;1 + " e
+
H;0 e
+
H;1   1 pp "

satises (68)-(72) because (84)
and (87) do not bind at e+. Additionally,
F (x0; L;H) < F (x+; L;H) = F+ < F0 < F (x0; H;L)
which implies e0 supports truth-reporting and is as e¢ cient as e+ because e00 = e
+
0 and
e01 = e
+
1 by construction. But since both constraints have been relaxed, a strictly more
e¢ cient decision function supporting truth-reporting can be constructed accordingly.
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Let deL;0 = deH;0 = 0, deL;1 = " and deH;1 =  1 pp " for " > 0. By (95), I have
A
"
de(x;L)
de(x;H)
#
=
"
pe(x;H)
  (1 p)2
p
e(x;L)
#
" (97)
which implies
de(x;H)je+ =  
pe(x;H)A21 +
(1 p)2
p
e(x;L)A11
kAk "

e+
.
Since A11je+ > 0,
A21je+
= (p  q)e(x+;H) + (1  q)e+H;0   (1  p)e+H;1   (p  q)e(x+;H) + (p  q)e+H;0 > 0
by e+H;0  e+H;1 and kAkje+ > 0 as proven in Step 2, de(x;H)je+ < 0.
This completes the proof.
1.5.16 Proof of Lemma 1.3
Given F+ 2 (0; 1), I can solve for e(x+;L) and e(x+;L) as
e(x+;L) =
qF+
 (p  q)F+ + p and e(x
+;H) =
(1  q)F+
(p  q)F+ + (1  p)
by F (x+; L;H) = F+ = F (x+; H;L) as proved in Theorem 1.4. Taking F+, e(x+;L)
and e(x+;H) as given, lets consider the set of the decision functions satisfying (93),
(94) and
y   (eH;0   eL;0)
(eH;1   eL;1)  (eH;0   eL;0) = F
+.
Notice each decision function in this set supports truth-reporting if it satises (84)-
(88) as well. Rewriting these three equations gives
A
264 eL;1eH;0
eH;1
375 = BeL;0 + C
where
A =
264  pe(x
+;H) 0 0
0  (1  q)(1  e(x+;L))  (1  p)e(x+;L)
 (1  p)y + (1  )F+ qy   (1  )(1  F+)  py   (1  )F+
375
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B =
264 q(1  e(x
+;H))
0
 [(1  q)y + (1  )(1  F+)]
375
C =
264  [q + p(1  q)]e(x
+;L) + q(1  p)e(x+;H)
p(1  q)e(x+;L)  [(1  q) + q(1  p)]e(x+;H)
 y
375 .
By algebra, I have2664
deL;1
deL;0
deH;0
deL;0
deH;1
deL;0
3775 = A 1B =
2664
  q(1 p)(1 F+)
p(1 q)F+
  q(1 p)
p(1 q)
q(1 p)2y(1 F+)+p(1 q)2yF++(1 )(p q)(1 F+)F+
p2(1 q)y(1 F+)+q2(1 p)yF++(1 )(p q)(1 F+)F+
1 F+
F+
q(1 p)2y(1 F+)+p(1 q)2yF++(1 )(p q)(1 F+)F+
p2(1 q)y(1 F+)+q2(1 p)yF++(1 )(p q)(1 F+)F+
3775
which implies
deL;1
deL;0
< 0,
deH;0
deL;0
< 0 and
deH;1
deL;0
> 0.
Furthermore, let deL;0 = " > 0, I have
de0
=
1  F+
p(1  q)
[p3(1  q)3   q3(1  p)3]y + (1  )(p  q)[p(1  q)2   q2(1  p)]F+
p2(1  q)y(1  F+) + q2(1  p)yF+ + (1  )(p  q)(1  F+)F+ "
de1
=
1  F+
p(1  q)
[p3(1  q)3   q3(1  p)3]y + (1  )(p  q)[p2(1  q)  q(1  p)2](1  F+)
p2(1  q)y(1  F+) + q2(1  p)yF+ + (1  )(p  q)(1  F+)F+ "
where de0 = (1  q)deL;0 + qdeH;0 and de1 = (1  p)deL;1 + pdeH;1. Hence,
de0
deL;0
> 0 and
de1
deL;0
> 0.
Therefore, a contradiction can be constructed if none of these three statements is
true as follows: there exists " > 0 such that e0 with e0 = e
+
 +
de
deL;0
" 8 2   supports
truth-reporting and is strictly more e¢ cient than e+ because e00 > e
+
0 and e
0
1 > e
+
1 .
This completes the proof.
1.5.17 Proof of Proposition 1.10
It su¢ ces to prove that given any SE with respect to w in which the principals
strategy features truth-reporting, there exist e; eL;0; eL;1; eH;0; eH;1 2 [0; 1] such that
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(32)-(34) and
(1  e)(1  q)
(1  e)(1  q) + e(1  p)eL;0 +
e(1  p)
(1  e)(1  q) + e(1  p)eL;1
(1  e)q
(1  e)q + epeH;0 +
ep
(1  e)q + epeH;1
are the NED probabilities of the agent exerting e¤ort in some SE with respect to w
in which the principals strategy features truth-reporting.
Suppose (e; r) is a SE with respect to w with the principals truth-reporting.
Dene
e = e(;)
e = (1  )E1
" 1X
t=1
t 1et
 s; 
#
8
where e is the NED probability of the agent at state  at the beginning of period 1
exerting e¤ort so that (32) is satised trivially and (33)-(34) are satised as the no
protable one-shot deviations conditions in period 0. Further dene the agents e¤ort
strategy e0 as a mixed strategy with e j (L; 0) for the probability (1 e0)(1 q)
(1 e0)(1 q)+e0(1 p)
and e j (L; 1) for the probability e0(1 p)
(1 e0)(1 q)+e0(1 p) . I show (e
0; r j (L;L)) is a SE
with respect to w in which r j (L;L) features truth-reporting. r j (L;L) features
truth-reporting because (L;L) is still on the equilibrium path. No matter what the
agents history is, he assigns the probability one to the principal being at state (L;L)
therefore having the continuation strategy r j (L;L). That implies given r j (L;L),
both e j (L; 0) and e j (L; 1) show sequential rationality by Denition 1. So does
e0 as the mixed strategy. And given the principals history (L;L), she assigns the
probability (1 e0)(1 q)
(1 e0)(1 q)+e0(1 p) to the agent being at state (L; 0) therefore having the
continuation strategy e j (L; 0). That implies given e0, r j (L;L) shows sequential
rationality too by Denition 1. Therefore, the result follows.
A similar argument shows (e00; r j (H;H)) is a SE with respect to w in which e00
is a mixed strategy with e j (H; 0) for the probability (1 e0)q
(1 e0)q+e0p and e j (H; 1) for the
probability e0q
(1 e0)q+e0p and r j (H;H) features truth-reporting.
So, I have
(1  )E0
" 1X
t=0
tet
 s
#
2 	[0; 1]  [0; 1]
for any SE (e; r) with respect to w with the principals truth-reporting. Proposition
10 follows by applying the logic above recursively. Notice the mapping 	 is monotonic
so that 	1([0; 1]) is well-dened.
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2 Equilibrium Matching and Termination
by Cheng Wang and Youzhi Yang
2.1 Introduction
In an equilibrium model of the labor market with moral hazard, we combine the
theory of search and matching and the theory of dynamic contracting. Jobs are
dynamic contracts. Equilibrium job separations are terminations of optimal dynamic
contracts. Transitions from unemployment to new jobs are modelled as a process of
matching and bargaining, as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Matched workers
and rms bargain over the values of the optimal contract to each party, and then
the dynamics of the optimal contract will take them to a state of termination. Non-
employed workers make consumption and saving decisions as in a typical growth
model, but they must also decide whether or not to participate in the labor market.
Firms enter freely into the market to endogenously determine the number of jobs in
the economy.
The standard Mortensen-Pissarides equilibrium matching model of the labor mar-
ket is built around two key assumptions: a matching and bargaining process sets the
worker and rm pair up for an employment relationship, and a dynamic but exoge-
nous process of match productivity then provides an engine for job separation. An
important extension of the standard equilibrium matching model is Moscarini (2005),
who puts the model of Jovanovic (1979) into the Mortensen-Pissarides framework to
model separation as a process of learning about the productivity of the match, and
allows the match to be dissolved once the perceived match productivity is su¢ ciently
low.
We take a dynamic contract point of view to modelling equilibrium job separation
in the Mortensen-Pissarides model. Workers and rms enter an optimal dynamic
contract upon a match, and job separation is then modelled as the termination of
the dynamic contract. In our environment of moral hazard, termination is used as
an incentive device to induce worker e¤orts, and as a way of minimizing the cost of
worker compensation. Workers that produce a sequence of bad outputs become too
poor to motivate, and workers who produce a sequence of good outputs become too
expensive to compensate and motivate, as in Spear and Wang (2005) and Sannikov
(2008)[42]. Following a termination, workers are free to go back to the labor market
to seek new matches, or choose to stay temporarily or permanently out of the labor
[42]Sannikov (2008) studies a continuous-time version of the dynamic principal-agent problem with
optimal termination. He also establishes the result that optimal replacement occurs when the agents
continuation value is either too low or too high. He then analyzes how optimal termination depends
on the parameters of the contracting environment, including for example the relative time preferences
of the principal and the agent.
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market. This generates equilibrium ows between employment and unemployment,
ows from employment to not-in-the-labor-force, and ows from not-in-the-labor-force
to unemployment.
Thus job separation is a purely endogenous process in our model, motivated by
the dynamic provision of incentives and risk sharing. Workers and rms are homo-
geneous, and matches are identical: they operate the same production function in all
periods. Termination occurs not because the technology of the match has evolved to
be su¢ ciently poor as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), or it is found out to be
su¢ ciently bad as in Moscarini (2005). Termination occurs because the economic re-
lationship that evolved endogenously around the xed match technology has become
too costly for the parties to maintain.
This strategy we take in modelling the dynamics in the labor market allows us
to determine endogenously and simultaneously the size and composition of all three
states of the labor market: employment, unemployment, and not-in-the-labor-force,
as well as the ows into and out of not-in-the-labor force. This is important, not only
for the explanation of the economys aggregate labor supply, but also necessary for
providing a more coherent and complete view of the stocks and ows of the labor mar-
ket. Labor market data, especially that in the recently available Current Population
Survey, show signicant ows of workers among all three states of the labor market,
as documented in several recent researches including Fallick and Fleischman (2004),
Nagypal (2005), Shimer (2005b). Yet most existing models in the search-matching
literature of the labor market focus on the interaction between employment and un-
employment (e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides (1997), Shimer (2005), Moscarini (2005),
Nagypal (2005)), without modelling explicitly the state of not-in-the-labor-force and
hence the size of the labor market. Sun-Bin Kim (2001) and Moscarini (2003) are
exceptions. In both papers though, an additional source of worker heterogeneity is
introduced into the Mortensen-Pissarises framework in order to generate ows into
retirement. In Moscarini (2003) for example, the productivity of a match depends
on a match specic variable, as well as a non-match-specic variable that captures
the ability of the worker. The values of both variables are learned during a match,
workers whose non-match-specic variable is learned to be su¢ ciently low choose to
withdraw from the labor market.
Wang (2005) also models endogenous labor force participation, but without adding
a second source of information friction or worker heterogeneity in addition to the one
that motivates layo¤s and unemployment. He considers a labor market with moral
hazard and shows that, if one allows dynamic contracts to be optimally terminated in
that environment, then terminations are of two types: involuntary layo¤s and perma-
nent retirements. In that paper, unemployment and non-participation are motivated
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by the same information friction, moral hazard, in a clean model environment with
homogeneous workers and matches. Workers who have a sequence of low outputs
become too costly to motivate and are laid o¤; workers who have performed well and
are promised a su¢ ciently high expected utility become too expensive to motivate
and compensate, they then retire permanently from the labor force.
Our approach to modelling the state of non-participation builds on Wang (2005)
but adds an important new dimension: non-employed workers are allowed to make
optimal consumption-saving decisions, and their decision on labor force participation
is based on the amount of assets they hold. We show that a non-employed worker
who holds a su¢ ciently small amount of assets will stay in the labor force after
termination: their value outside the labor market is too low. We also show that a
non-employed worker with a su¢ ciently large amount of saving will choose to quit
the labor force permanently: their opportunity cost of re-entering the labor market is
too high. In the quantitative version of our model that is calibrated to the U.S. data,
there are non-employed workers whose level of wealth is neither su¢ ciently low to
justify immediate returning back to the labor market, nor su¢ ciently high to justify
staying permanently out of the labor market. These workers choose to quit the labor
force temporarily, dissave, and eventually go back to the labor market once their
assets are reduced to a su¢ ciently low level to make them protable for the rms
to employ. Thus our model generates not only ows into not-in-the-labor-force from
employment, but also ows out of not-in-the-labor-force. Wang (2005) does not have
equilibrium ows from non-participation to the labor force, neither does it explicitly
model matching and bargaining in the labor market as we do in this paper.
That non-employed workers are allowed to save also distinguishes our model from
the existing search-matching models. Most existing search-matching models of the
labor market, including Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), do not allow workers to
save. In those models, although employed workers are heterogeneous in the wages
they earn, unemployed workers are homogeneous since they all hold zero amounts of
assets. In our model, there is an equilibrium ergodic distribution of non-employed
workers who di¤er in the amount of assets they hold. These workers make di¤erent
consumption and saving decisions, and di¤erent decisions on labor force participation.
While this endogenous wealth heterogeneity among non-employed workers gives rise
to considerable technical complexities, it is essential to our models being able to
generate dynamics from not-in-the-labor-force to unemployment.
An important assumption in the Mortensen-Passarides model is that workers and
rms cannot commit to long-term relationships, and wages are bargained sequentially
upon realization of the current match productivity. In our model, rms can fully
commit to any long-term contract, although workers are allowed to quit an ongoing
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employment relationship if it o¤ers a value lower than the workersoutside alternative.
Bargaining occurs only once, before the employment relationship begins, and is over
the total values of the optimal contract to the parties. Wages are state contingent
compensation payments to the worker that are dictated by the optimal structure of
the optimal contract, not bargained repeatedly each period.
One could allow rms and workers to enter dynamic contracts and let bargaining
take place only once also in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Without private infor-
mation or other types of frictions though, perfect consumption smoothing would imply
a constant wage over the workers tenure at the rm. This in turn would imply a wage
distribution that is essentially identical to the exogenous distribution of the random
match productivity. The assumption of repeated wage bargaining, although help-
ful for generating an ergodic wage distribution in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994),
implies that wages are not su¢ ciently rigid for the model to match business cycle
movements in the data (Hall (2005), Shimer (2005)). Rudanko (2007) models long-
term wage contracts with limited commitment in a search-matching model of the
labor market to produce the observed wage rigidity/volatility. Obviously, our model
o¤ers a potential alternative for accounting for the observed wage rigidity/volatility
that is based on an optimal trade o¤ between consumption smoothing and incentives.
In an important recent study, Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2006) argue that
standard equilibrium search-matching models can generate only a very small, 3:6%,
di¤erential between the average and the lowest wages paid in the U.S. labor market,
and the observed Mm ratiothe ratio between the average wage and lowest wage paid
is at least twenty times larger than what the model observes. As the paper explains,
The short unemployment durations, as in the U.S. data, reveal that agents in the
model do not nd it worthwhile to wait because frictional wage inequality is tiny. The
message of search theory is that good things come to those who wait, so if the wait
is short, it must be that good things are not likely to happen. (page 9.) The paper
further shows that the extensions of the standard search and matching models can
only modestly improve their performance on accounting for the observed Mm ratio.
Our model is capable of generating much larger wage dispersions than the existing
equilibrium search and matching models. In a quantitative version of our model
that is calibrated to the U.S. data, the computed Mm ratio is 24:5, similar to what
Hornstein, Krusell and Violante observe in the U.S. data. The reason our model is
better in accounting for the observed wage dispersion is clear. In our model, wage
dispersion is driven by the provision of intertemporal incentives and intertemporal
risk sharing. Wages of homogenous workers who start with the same initial expected
utility fan out over time as their outputs follow a stochastic process. In our model,
workers who produce a sequence of high outputs will see their wages increase over time,
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and workers that produce a sequence of low outputs will see their wages decrease over
time. This e¤ect of the dynamic contracting on distribution was rst discussed in
Green (1987) and Atkeson and Lucas (1991). In this paper, the same mechanism is
put to work in an equilibrium search/matching framework.
The model is presented in the next section. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4 we formulate
and analyze a stationary equilibrium of the model. We then calibrate the model to
the U.S. economy in Section 2.5 to study the structure of the equilibrium dynamic
contract, the stocks and ows of the labor market, and worker compensation dynamics.
Section 2.6 concludes the paper.
2.2 Setup
Let time be denoted t = 1; 2;    The model economy has one consumption good,
and is populated by one unit of homogeneous workers. Workers survive into the next
period with a constant probability  2 (0; 1). At the beginning of each period, 1 
units of workers are born so the measure of workers in each period is constant at one.
Workers that are born in period ( 1) have the following preferences:
E
1X
t=
()t  [u(ct)  (at)];
where  2 (0; 1) is the workers discount factor, u : R+ ! R denotes the workers
utility function, ct his consumption;  : f0g
S
[a; a] ! R, where a > a  0, denotes
the workers disutility function, at his e¤ort. We make the following assumptions
on u and : u() is bounded, continuous, di¤erentiable, and strictly concave; () is
continuously di¤erentiable, and strictly convex on [a; a].
The model economy is also populated with a large measure of identical rms.
Firms maximize expected discounted prots, and they discount future prots using a
constant discount factor 1=(1 + r), where r > 0 denotes the interest rate rms face.
In any given period, some rms are in the market, the rest not. Firms are allowed to
freely enter or exit the market and so the measure of the rms that are in the market,
, is an endogenous variable. Firms in the market must be matched with a worker in
order to produce. A matched pair of rm and worker creates a job.
In any given period, the total measure of matches formed in the labor market is
equal to
M(A;    E),
where A is the measure of the unemployed workers (non-employed and actively look-
ing for a job) in the labor market, and E is the measure of the workers that are
currently employed when the labor market opens, and hence   E is the measure of
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vacant (recruiting) rms in the labor market. Throughout the paper, we assume the
matching function is such that
0 M(A;    E) < minfA;    Eg,
so there is always a positive measure of workers and rms that are not matched.
A rm that fails to nd a match could either exit the market or to operate as a
vacant rm in the remainder of the period, waiting for the labor market to open next
period. We follow the literature to assume that a vacant rm must incur a xed cost
c0( 0) in order to stay open to job applications.
The matched rm and worker Nash bargain over a dynamic employment contract.
This dynamic contract species a history contingent rule for compensating and ter-
minating the worker. Once they agree on a specic contract, this contract cannot be
renegotiated in any future periods.
Production then takes place immediately after a contract is agreed on. In each
period, the employed worker produces a random output  2 f1;   ; ng with proba-
bilities f1(a);   ; n(a)g, where a 2 A  [a; a] is the workers e¤ort, i : A! (0; 1),
and A  R+ is the set of possible e¤ort levels. For all a 2 A, let (a) =
P
i i(a)i.
Assume 
0
(a) =1.
The models information structure is the same as that in the standard model of
moral hazard. Specically, the workers e¤ort is not observable to the rm, but the
output he produces is publicly observable and veriable. Other parameters of the
model are common knowledge to all agents in the model.
There is a risk free asset in the model: for each unit of the good invested in
this asset, it returns (1 + r) units of consumption next period. To avoid introducing
additional information asymmetry, we assume that all investments in this asset are
public information and transferable between workers and rms. Workers also have
access to a competitive insurance market where one unit of consumption in the current
period can be exchanged for 1= units of consumption in the next period conditional
on the workers survival in the next period.
As part of the models physical environment, we make four assumptions about
the contracts that are feasible between the worker and the rm. First, contracts are
subject to a non-negativity constraint that requires that compensation to the worker
be non-negative. Second, once the worker and the rm agree on a contract, they
can commit to not renegotiating the continuations of the contract in all future dates.
Third, rms can fully commit to the terms of a long-term contract, whereas workers
commitment to a long-term contract is limited: workers are free to leave an ongoing
long-term contract anytime there is a better outside value. Forth, severance payments
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must be made in lump-sum amounts to the worker immediately upon termination.
Once an employment relationship is terminated, no further interactions between the
rm and the worker are feasible.
2.3 Equilibrium
In this section, we formulate the economys stationary equilibrium. We rst describe
the economys aggregate state variables. We then describe the optimization problems
that workers and rms face, taking the aggregate states as given. Finally, we require
that the aggregate states and individual optimization be consistent with each other,
and that the rms in the market be making zero prots.
2.3.1 The aggregate states
At the beginning of each period, the state of the economy is characterized by the
following aggregate state variables
 = f(SA; A; A); (SI ; I ; I); (X;E; E); g:
Here,  is the measure of rms in the market. The scalar A 2 (1   ; 1) is the
measure of the non-employed workers who are actively looking for employment. These
workers are distributed over the set SA  R+ according to the distribution function
A : SA ! [0; 1], where SA is the set of possible amounts of assets these workers hold.
The scalar I 2 (1   ; 1) is the measure of the non-employed workers who do not
participate in the labor force. These workers are distributed over the set SI  R+
according to the distribution function I : SI ! [0; 1], where SI is the set of possible
amounts of assets these workers hold. The scalar E 2 (0; 1) denotes the the measure
of workers that are employed at the beginning of a period. Finally, the employed
workers are distributed over
X 

u(0)  (a)
1   ;
u(1)  (0)
1  

 [Vmin; Vmax);
the set of all possible expected utilities of the employed workers at the beginning of a
period, the distribution function being E : X ! [0; 1]. Clearly, A, I and E must
satisfy
E + A + I = 1:
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2.3.2 Optimization
Conditional on , an optimal solution to the rms and the workers optimization
problems is a duple
 
8>><>>:

(V ); a(V ); [ci(V ); Vi(V )]
n
i=1; V 2 
U ;U(V ); V 2 
v(s); s 2 R+;Vm(s); s 2 SA; Vn(s); s 2 R+
9>>=>>;
where the variables in  are dened through (i)-(v) in the following.
(i) The tuple f
(V ); a(V ); [ci(V ); Vi(V )]ni=1; V 2 g is the dynamic contract for
the currently employed worker. Here we follow Green (1987) and Spear and Srivastava
(1987) to use the workers beginning of period expected utility as a state variable to
summarize the workers history at the rm. The set   X is the state space. This
is the set of all expected utilities of the employed worker that can be delivered by
a (sub-game perfect) feasible and incentive compatible contract. Note that  is an
endogenous variable of the model. Then, for all V 2 , a(V ) denotes the workers
recommended e¤ort in the current period, 
(V ) denotes the set of workers output
realizations in which the worker is retained, and outside which the worker is termi-
nated. Finally, ci(V ) and Vi(V ) are, respectively, the workers current compensation
(consumption) and next period utility if his current output is i.
(ii) For all V 2 , U(V ) 2 R denotes the value of a rm who currently employs
a worker with expected utility V . U 2 R is the value of a vacant rm: a rm that is
free to hire a new worker at the beginning of a period, before the market opens.
(iii) The set SA  R+ denotes the set of assets of the non-employed workers who
choose to participate in the current labor market, and the set SI = R+=SA denotes
the set of assets of the non-employed workers who do not participate in the current
labor market. Note that a non-employed worker could choose to stay out of the labor
market for a number of periods and then re-enter. The scalars A and I denote,
respectively, the numbers of the non-employed workers that belong to the sets SA and
SI , respectively. We have A+I = N . Finally, A : SA ! [0; 1] and I : SI ! [0; 1],
respectively, are the distributions of the non-employed workers who are in the labor
market and those who are not.
(iv) For any given s 2 R+, v(s) 2 R denotes the maximized value of the beginning-
of-period (before the labor market opens) expected utility of an non-employed worker
with assets s; Vn(s) denotes the ex-post expected utility of this worker conditional on
his not being matched with a rm (either he chose not to participate in the market
(s 2 SI), or he went to the market (s 2 SA) but failed to nd a match); Finally, Vm(s)
denotes the bargained expected utility of the worker conditional on (a) he chose to
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go to the market (i:e:; s 2 SA) and (b) he is matched with a rm.
Let  denote the fraction of the vacant rms to obtain a match in the period:
 =
M(A;    E)
   E
. (98)
Let  denote the fraction of unemployed workers to transition to employment (ratio
of hiring out of the pool of the unemployed):
 =
M(A;    E)
A
. (99)
The restriction we put on the matching functionM in Section 2 ensures 0 < ;  < 1.
Denition 2.1 We say that  is an optimal solution to the rm and the workers
optimization problem, conditional upon a given set of the markets states  and the
implied  and , if it satises the following conditions (I) to (IV).
Condition (I)
U = 
Z
SA
(U(Vm(s)) + s)dA(s) + (1  )
1
1 + r
U   c0 (100)
Condition (II) For all V 2 ,
U(V )= max
f
;a;ci;Vig
X
i62

i(a)

i   ci + 
1 + r
 
U   v 1(Vi)

+
X
i2

i(a)

i   ci + 
1 + r
U(Vi)

+
1 
1 + r
U (101)
subject to (102)-(106) where
V =
nX
i=1
i(a)[u(ci) + Vi]  (a) (102)
a = argmax
a02A

nP
i=1
i(a
0)[u(ci) + Vi]  (a0)

(103)

  ; (104)
ci  0; 8i (105)
Vi 2 ; 8i 2 
 (106)
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Vi 2 v(R+); 8i 62 
 (107)
Vi  v(0); 8i (108)
where the function v : R+ ! R, its inverse v 1, which is to be shown to exist later in
the paper, and the value of v(0), will be given in Condition (IV);
Condition (III) The set  of all expected utilities for an employed worker that can be
generated by a feasible and incentive compatible contract is the largest self-generating
set of the mapping B : 2X ! 2X dened by: 80  X,
B(0)  fV 2 Xj9f
; a; ci; Vig s:t: (102)  (105); (107); (108); and Vi 2 0 8i 2 
g:
(109)
Condition (IV) The non-employed-workers problem about whether to enter the labor
market and the related values are described by
SA 

s 2 R+ : 9V 2 ; V  Vn(s) such that U(V ) + s  1
1 + r
U

; (110)
SI  R+SA (111)
where
Vn(s) = max
0cs

u(c)  (0) + v

1 + r

(s  c)

8s 2 [0;+1); (112)
Vm(s) = arg max
V 2;VVn(s);U(V )+s  11+rU0

U(V ) + s  1
1 + r
U
!
(V Vn(s))1 !; 8s 2 SA
(113)
8s 2 R+, v(s) =
(
Vm(s) + (1  )Vn(s) , if s 2 SA
Vn(s) , if s 2 SI
. (114)
Conditions (I)-(IV) formulate a set of Bellman equations for the values of the rms
and the workers, along with the optimal strategies.
Condition (I) gives the value of a vacant rm at the beginning of a period. With
probability  this vacant rm is matched with an unemployed worker with assets s
who is drawn randomly from the distribution A. Once matched, the worker gives
his assets s to the rm, and the rm gives the worker an employment contract that
promises the worker expected utility Vm(s). This Vm(s) is the solution to the Nash
bargaining problem to be formulated in equation (113).
Implicitly in equation (4) is the assumption that assets are freely transferable be-
tween the worker and the rm. Suppose assets are not freely transferable. Suppose for
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example assets could not be transferred at all between the worker and the rm. Then
an additional state variable will be needed for recursively formulating the dynamic
contract. We leave this possibility for future work.
Condition (II) gives the optimal dynamic contract between an employed worker
and the rm, along with the value of the rm as a function of the workers expected
utility. In equation (5), v 1(Vi) is the cost to the rm of letting the worker leave the
rm with a promised utility equal to Vi. Here v 1 is the inverse of the workers value
function v which, in turn, is dened in equation (18). That is, in order to guarantee
that the worker obtains a level of expected utility equal to Vi, the rm must make
a severance payment to the worker in the amount v 1(Vi). Note that at this stage,
it is not clear whether the inverse function v 1, and the function Vm in equation (4)
are well dened. In the next section, we will show that the function v is indeed well
dened, continuous, and strictly increasing over its domain R+, and hence its inverse
exists and is monotonic. We will also show that Vm(s) is well dened for each s 2 SA.
Since each worker dies with probability (1   ), the rm faces in each period a
constant probability of (1 ) to become vacant next period.
Constraint (6) is promise-keeping. Constraint (7) is incentive compatibility. Equa-
tion (8) says that the contract can terminate in any chosen subset of the workers
outputs. Equation (9) requires the workers compensation to be non-negative: the
limited liability constraint.
Constraints (106) and (107) require that the expected utility Vi promised to the
worker be feasible. Specically, if the worker is retained, then the promised utility
must be achievable by a sub-game perfect feasible and incentive compatible contract;
if the worker is terminated, then the expected utility the worker receives must be
supportable by a feasible severance payment s.
Equation (12) is a self-enforcing constraint. Under this constraint, the worker will
not have an incentive to leave the contract in all ex post states of the world. This
constraint is not needed if we assume full commitment.
Condition (III) provides a Bellman equation for the state space of the dynamic
contract. This follows Abreu, Pearce and Stachetti (1990) and Wang (1997).
Equation (14) denes the set of non-employed workers that are in the market, SA.
The condition it imposes on all s 2 SA say that, in order for a non-employed worker
to be willing to participate in the labor force, there must exist a feasible and incentive
compatible contract to make the worker and the rm both better o¤ should they form
a match.
Equation (16) describes the optimization problem for the non-employed worker
who is not matched with a rm, either he was in the market but failed to form a
match, or he chose not to participate in the labor market. The problem for this
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worker, which is the same as that for the consumer in a typical growth model, is one
of nding the optimal consumption and saving scheme.
Equation (17) lays out the problem of Nash bargaining between a worker and a
rm who are matched. The parameter ! 2 (0; 1) is the exogenously given bargaining
weight for the rm. Since in each period each rm and each worker can nd at most
one match, U=(1 + r) is the rms reservation utility, and Vn(s) is the workers. The
bargaining game here thus involves choosing a level of the expected utility V in the
set  of attainable expected utilities to give to the worker, and this expected utility
exceeds the workers reservation utility, makes the rm better o¤ than its reservation
utility, and maximizes the Nash product of surpluses.
Note that implicit in Equation (17) is the assumption that (a) the Nash bargaining
problem has a solution and (b) the solution is unique. Proposition 2.2 in the next
section will verify that this assumption is satised.
Finally, equation (18) describes the non-employed workers decision about whether
or not to participate in the current labor market. Note that since the worker does
not incur any costs being in the labor market, we make the assumption that workers
choose to participate in the labor market if and only if they could with a match
that o¤ers an expected utility that is higher than Vn(s). Workers who have a zero
probability to be hired will voluntarily stay out of the labor market.
2.3.3 Equilibrium
Denition 2.2 A stationary equilibrium of the model is a tuple f; ; ; g that sat-
ises the following conditions:
(i)  and  are given by (98) and (99).
(ii) Conditional on ,  and ,  solves the worker and the rms optimization
problems that are dened by Conditions (I)-(IV) in Denition 1.
(iii)  is generated by  and is stationary.
(iv) Free entry of rms into the market ensures
U = 0:
2.4 Analysis
In this section, we analyze the Bellman equations in Denition 1 that jointly charac-
terize the worker and the rms optimization problems. We begin with a set of useful
observations. Observe rst that
Vm(s)  v(s)  Vn(s); 8s 2 SA: (115)
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This holds because the denitions of SA and Vm(s) imply Vm(s)  Vn(s) and that
v(s) is a convex combination of Vm(s) and Vn(s) for all s 2 SA. Notice next that
Vn(0) = u(0)  (a) + v(0):
Notice also that
v(0)  Vmin:
This holds because the non-employed worker with s = 0 can always choose to stay
out of the labor market permanently to obtain Vmin. Notice therefore
v(0)  Vn(0) = u(0)  (a) + v(0)  Vmin: (116)
Assumption 1 u(1)  u(0)  [(a)  (0)].
This assumption is not di¢ cult to satisfy. A su¢ cient condition for it to hold is
u(1)  (a)  u(0)  (0). That is, the worker is better o¤ working and having an
innite amount of consumption than not working and not consuming. But we need
Assumption 1 to show that the set  is an interval.
Proposition 2.1  =
h
Vn(0);
u(1) (a)
1 

:
Remember Vn(0) = u(0)  (a) + v(0) is the expected utility of a worker who
is not matched with a rm and has zero assets.
Assumption 2 The value function U : ! R is continuous and concave.
This assumption is reasonable, for the continuity and concavity of U could always
be obtained through randomization over employment contracts if necessary. See Athey
and Bagwell (2001).
Notice that U(V ) !  1 as V ! [u(1)   (0)]=(1   ). This holds because,
independent of the contract used, the expected prots of a rm are bounded from
above while the cost of delivering V to the worker goes to innity as V goes to
[u(1)  (0)]=(1  ). With this and Assumption 1, let
V  = max

V 0 : V 0 2 argmax
V 2
U(V )

:
This V  exists, is unique, and has the following interpretation: If the rm is free to
o¤er any expected utility from  to a newly hired worker with assets s = 0, V  is the
starting expected utility to promise to the worker at which the rm can achieve its
maximum value, U(V ).
Notice that V  may not be equal to the bargained expected utility Vm(0), although
it does always hold that V   Vm(0). Suppose V  > Vm(0). Then by letting Vm(0) =
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V  the worker is strictly better o¤ and the rm is weakly better o¤. Notice next that
since V  is taken from the set , and from Proposition 2.1 Vn(0) is the minimum
element in , it holds automatically that V   Vn(0). Moreover, with the assumption
that 
0
(0) =1, this inequality must hold strictly, that is,
V  > Vn(0):
In other words, the rm would start a new worker that has zero assets with an
expected utility that is strictly greater than his reservation expected utility. To see
this, suppose V = Vn(0): Then the optimal contract entails that the workers e¤ort
is the minimum a and his compensation is 0, for otherwise his expected utility would
strictly exceed Vn(0). But this is not optimal given 
0(a) < 
0
(0) =1.
We now proceed to provide an analysis of the non-employed workers problem that
is dened by Condition (V) in Denition 1. If analysis will be partial, in the sense
that we will take the vacant rms value U and the non-vacant rms value function
U() as given and seek to characterize the value functions v(), Vn(), and Vm().
Notice that the function v() plays a central role in dening the rm and workers
optimization problems. First, v() provides a link between the rms optimization
problem [equations (4)-(13)] and the workers problem [equations (14)-(18)]. Second,
as we will show, if v() is well dened and continuous, then the workers other value
functions Vn() and Vm() are also well dened and continuous. Given this, the strategy
of our analysis is to formulate the function v() as a xed point of a contraction
mapping on a space of bounded and continuous function, and then use the contraction
mapping theorem to obtain that v() is uniquely dened and continuous[43].
Assumption 3 There exists a feasible and incentive compatible one-period contract
0 that o¤ers the worker expected utility V0  u(0)   (0) and the rm expected
prot (V0) > 0.
Proposition 2.2 Given the vacant rms value U and non-vacant rms value func-
tion U(V ); V 2 , the following holds for the non-employed worker. (i) The non-
employed workers value function v() is well dened, continuous, and strictly in-
creasing in R+: (ii) The non-matched workers value function Vn() is well dened,
continuous, and strictly increasing on R+; (iii) The matched workers value function
Vm is well dened, continuous, and weakly increasing on SA;
[43]A full analysis of the rm and workers optimization problem (as dened in Denition 1) would
require characterizing the value functions U; U() and v() simultaneously in a unied xed point
argument. A di¢ culty is that the function U() is not bounded so the contraction mapping theorem
could not be applied for the proof of existence.
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We also have
v(R+) = [v(0); Vmax):
With this, and given (116), we have
[v(0); Vmax)  ;
and we can rewrite constraints (106)-(108) as
Vi 2 [v(0); Vmax):
This leads to
Proposition 2.3 With the optimal contract, i 2 
 if and if U(Vi) > U   v 1(Vi)
This result is intuitive, it says that the worker is retained if the value of retention
is greater than the value of termination. Notice that since in equilibrium U = 0, the
above proposition permits the rm to retain a worker that has a negative value to the
rm, as long as the value of terminating him is even lower.
Proposition 2.4 Suppose a newly-terminated worker with expected utility V goes
back to the labor market immediately [i:e:; v 1(V ) 2 SA]. Then either U > 0, or there
exists V 0 2  such that V 0 > V and U(V 0) > U(V ).
Given that U(V ) is concave, in equilibrium with U = 0, in order for a worker
to go back to the labor market immediately after termination, his expected utility
must be su¢ ciently low, lower than V . In other words, a newly terminated worker
is unemployed if he is terminated from the left hand side of the rms value function.
Worker who are terminated from the right hand side of the rms value function will
stay out of the labor force for at least one period.
Consider the set of the promised expected utilities of the worker upon which the
worker is retained. Then for each V in this set, consider the amount of assets v 1(V )
the worker would receive if the worker were terminated. Let
b
  fv 1(V )jV 2 [v(0); Vmax); U(V ) > U   v 1(V )g:
Next, let
b
A  fv 1(V )jV 2 [v(0); V); U(V ) < U   v 1(V )g;
b
I  fv 1(V )jV 2 [V; Vmax); U(V ) < U   v 1(V )g:
87
Each element in b
A (b
I) is a level of assets that corresponds to a level of utility V
at which the worker is terminated from the left (right) hand side of the rms value
function. The following proposition establishes the connection between the rms
decision about when to terminate the worker and the workers decision about when
to enter the labor market.
Proposition 2.5 In equilibrium it holds that SA = b
AS b
 and SI = b
I .
Proposition 2.6 There exists s > 0 such that [0; s]  SA. Moreover, if a = 0, then
[0; v 1(V )]  SA.
So a non-employer worker must be unemployed if he is su¢ ciently poor. This is
intuitive, for his value of staying out of the labor force is lower given his small s.
Assumption 3 There exists V such that the following inequality holds for all V  V .
   (1  )U  u 1[(1  )V + (a)]  u 1[(1  )V ]:
Assumption 3 is easily satised. Notice that since u() is concave, u 1() is convex,
and u 1[(1  )V + (a)]  u 1[(1  )V ] is increasing in V .
Proposition 2.7 Under Assumption 3, the set b
 is bounded. Or equivalently, there
exists V > v(0) such that for all V  V , U(V ) < U   v 1(V ).
This proposition says that a worker cannot be employed with a level of expected
utility that is su¢ ciently high: he would have been terminated. In fact, by Proposition
2.8, a non-employed worker with a su¢ ciently high V will choose not to be in the
labor market.
Among workers that choose not to participate in the labor force currently, there
are those who have chosen to quit the labor force permanently, and those who are just
temporarily out of the labor force. Our next proposition shows that non-employed
workers who are rich enough, with a large enough s, will choose to retire permanently
from the labor market.
Proposition 2.8 Assume  = 1
1+r
. Then there exists s < 1 such that the non-
employed worker will choose to stay out of the labor force permanently if s  s.
We therefore have the following expression for a part of the function v():
v(s) =
u(1+r

s)  (0)
1   ; 8s  s
:
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2.5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we calibrate our model to the U.S. data, analyze it numerically, and
show that our model could do a better job accounting for the observed wage dispersion
than standard search/matching models.
2.5.1 Parameterization and Calibration
We set the time period to be one month. We set the discount rate to be r = 0:00417
to obtain an annual interest rate of 5%. We then set the workers discount factor to
be  = 1=(1 + r). We set  = 0:99815 so the workers expected lifetime is 45 years.
We set the workers utility function to be
u(c)  (a) = log(0 + 1c)  a2;
where 0 is normalized to 1 and 1 > 0.
We set n = 2 so output can be low (1) or high (2). We assume
1(a) = exp(  a); 2(a) = 1  exp(  a); 8a  0;
where  > 0. We follow the literature to assume a Cobb-Douglas matching function
so that
M(A;    E) = 0A(   E)1 
The above parameterization leaves us with the following parameters for the cali-
bration of the model:
1; 2; 1;  ; 0; c0; :
We target a measure of unemployed workers equal to 0:0342, a measure of employed
workers equal to 0:6336, and a measure of those not in the labor force equal to 0:3320.
These values are derived from The Current Population Survey (CPS) which provides
monthly time series data on employment, unemployment and not-in-the-labor-force,
for the period between January 1994 and December 2003. These target measures
imply an unemployment rate of 5:12%, and a labor force participation rate of 66:78%.
We target a job nding probability of 28:3%, following Fallick and Fleischman
(2004). We follow the literature to set  = 0:6. The literature reports a value of
 between 0:5 and 0:7 (Blanchard and Diamond (1989), Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001)).
Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger (2007) reports a job opening rate of 3:4% for the
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period from December 2000 to January 2005[44]. Using this information, we choose
the value of 0 to generate a job nding probability (fraction of the unemployed to
ow into employment) of 28:3%:
0

   E
A
1 0:6
= 0

0:034  0:6336
0:0342
1 0:6
= 0:283
which gives us 0 = 0:3405. In addition, given that
job opening rate =
   employment
employment
we obtain  = 1:034 0:6338 = 0:6551.
We follow Shimer (2005) to set ! = 0:4 (Hosios 1990). We could alternatively set
! = 0:5 without signicantly change the calibration outcome.
We are now left with ve free parameters 1; 2;  ; 1; c0, and we choose their values
to target 6 (essentially 5) measures of the U.S. data: the measures of employment
(E), unemployment (U), non-participation (N); the rate of ow from employment
to unemployment, the job nding probability (rate of ow from unemployment to
employment), and the job opening rate (vacancies as a fraction of employment).
The following table gives the values of the parameters chosen.
Parameter Value
1  0:5000
2 2:5000
 0:6386
1 1:2771
c0 0:0096
The following table compares the calibrated model with data.
Variable Data Model
fraction of employment 0:6336 0:6317
fraction of unemployment 0:0342 0:0350
fraction of not in the labor force 0:3320 0:3333
job opening rate 3:4% 3:7%
E to U probability 1:3% 1:26%
U to E probability 28:3% 29:1%
The model does a good job matching the targets. Note that conditional on em-
[44]Their measure is based on the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS).
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ployment, which is an independent target to match, the job opening rate essentially
measures the stock of vacancies in the economy.
The U.S. data shows a large ow from unemployment to not-in-the-labor-force,
reecting the movements of discouraged workers, and the movements from unemploy-
ment to education. Our model lacks a channel for the ow from unemployment to
NLF.
The U.S. data also shows a signicant ow of workers from not-in-the-labor-force
to employment. This reects the fact that, in practice, rms search not only among
workers that are unemployed, but also among workers that are not in the labor force.
This mechanism is missing in our model. In the model, workers must be actively
looking for jobs before being matched with a rm.
Finally, notice that the ows from employment to unemployment and from em-
ployment to not-in-the-labor-force are much smaller in the model than in the data.
These are not surprising. In the data, a large fraction of the transitions from em-
ployment to not in the labor force are due to life-cycle reasons, or younger workers
quitting the labor force to obtain higher education. These are not in our model. In
the data, the ow from not in the labor force to unemployment reects perhaps the
movements of the previously discouraged workers and the young workers who enter
the labor market after nishing education.
2.5.2 Equilibrium
Figure 1 depicts the rms net gains from retaining (rather than terminating) the
worker as a function of the workers expected utility. In order to deliver a given level
of expected utility V to the worker, the rms net prots are U(V ) if it retains the
worker and U   v 1(V ) if it terminates the worker, and in equilibrium U = 0. The
value of the di¤erence is shown in Figure 1. Obviously, termination is optimal if and
only the value of V is su¢ ciently small or su¢ ciently large.
Figure 2 depicts the law of motion for the employed workers expected utility as
a function of his current output. The workers expected utility is higher (lower) next
period if his current is higher (lower) this period.
Figure 4 shows the (deterministic) law of motion for the workers assets: st+1  st
as a function of st. There is critical asset level above which the non-employed worker
chooses not to enter the labor market. For su¢ ciently high asset levels, there is not
a non-negative Nash surplus between the worker and the rm.
The stationary distributions of employed workers and non-employed workers (un-
employed plus not-in-in-the-labor-force) are shown in Figures 5 and 6, respectively.
There is clearly a signicant amount of welfare dispersion among the employed work-
ers.
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At each point in time, looking forward each employed worker faces a stochastic
number of periods over which to remain employed. Figure 8 depicts the distribution
of the duration of the current job for a worker with four di¤erent level of starting
expected utilities. Obviously, the worker who has an expected utility that is neither
too low nor too higher will longer on this current job on average.
In equilibrium, a worker who leaves his job with an expected utility above the
upper bound of the retention interval will not go back to the labor market immediately,
a worker who leaves his job with an expected utility below the lower bound of the
retention interval will go back to labor market right away. Hence, the former consists
of the employment to not-in-the-labor-force transition, and the latter consists of the
employment to unemployment transition.
Furthermore, each worker is born without any saving. As a result, his rst job is
characterized by a contract delivering relatively low expected utility. It takes time for
him to establish a good record, and in turn be promised a relatively high expected
utility.
Figure 9 is based on simulation and shows that the probability to transition from
employment to unemployment decreases with the age of the worker, while the prob-
ability to transition from employment to not-in-the-labor-force is increasing with the
age of the worker. These are consistent with ndings in Nagypal (2005)[45].
2.5.3 Wage Dispersion
Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2006) show that standard search matching models
can generate only a very small, 3:6%, di¤erential between the average wage and the
lowest wage paid in the labor market, whereas the observed Mm ratiothe ratio be-
tween the average wage and lowest wage paidis at least twenty times larger than
what the model observes. Hornstein, Krusell and Violante further show that the ex-
tensions to the standard search and matching models can only modestly improve their
performance on accounting for the observed Mm ratio. As HKV argue, the logic of
the search/matching model implies that a higher wage dispersion is associated with
longer unemployment durations or a smaller probability of nding employment for
the unemployed. Given that unemployment durations are typically short in the data,
wage dispersion cannot be large in the model[46].
This logic of the search/matching model does not apply in our model. In our
model, wage dispersion is driven by the provision of intertemporal incentives and
[45]In Nagypal (2005), the probability to transition from employment to not-in-the-labor-force for
younger workers is unusually high which might be explained by the higher education admission.
[46]As the paper explains, The short unemployment durations, as in the U.S. data, reveal that
agents in the model do not nd it worthwhile to wait because frictional wage inequality is tiny. The
message of search theory is that good things come to those who wait, so if the wait is short, it
must be that good things are not likely to happen.(page 9.)
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risk sharing. Wages of homogenous workers who start with the same initial expected
utility fan out over time as their outputs follow a stochastic process. In our model,
workers who produce a high output not only receive a higher wage in the current
period, but also will see their future utilities and wages increased. Likewise, and
workers that produce a low outputs will receive lower wages in the current period and
in the future[47].
Our model is capable of generating much larger wage dispersions than standard
search and matching models do. In the version of the model that is calibrated to the
U.S. data, the computed average wage is 0:4071; and the lowest wage paid is 0:0166,
and the Mm ratio is 24:5, similar to what Hornstein, Krusell and Violante observe in
the U.S. data.
Suppose we use the average wage of the workers in the lowest wage percentile as
the minimum wage in the calculation, then the computed Mm ratio is 13.89. Even if
we use the average wage of the workers in the 5th wage percentile as the minimum
wage in the calculation, the computed Mm ratio is 5.32, much larger than what the
search/matching models permit. Note that our model generates the same job nding
probability for the unemployed, and hence the same average unemployment duration,
as the calibrated search/matching models do.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied an equilibrium model of the labor market which mod-
ies the Mortensen-Pissarides framework by taking a dynamic contract approach to
jobs and job separation. The dynamic contract is motivated by a standard infor-
mation friction: moral hazard. Optimal terminations of dynamic contracts generate
equilibrium worker ows from employment to unemployment and to not-in-the-labor-
force. Matching and bargaining bring unemployed workers to employment. As in the
data, in the model average wages increase with worker tenure, and on average workers
who have stayed longer with the rm face lower layo¤ probabilities. Our model o¤ers
an important advantage over standard search and matching models: we have shown
quantitatively that our model generates wage dispersions that are similar to those
observed in the data while standard search-matching models cannot.
Our model has a number of possible extensions among which perhaps the most
important and challenging is to add aggregate uncertainties to our currently stationary
environment. As discussed in the introduction of the paper, existing search-matching
models have not been able to account for the observed pattern of wage dynamics
over the business cycle. Our model o¤ers a natural and promising alternative, given
[47]The e¤ect of the dynamic contracting on distribution was rst discussed in Green (1987) and
Atkeson and Lucas (1991).
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that the structure of compensation is designed to achieve e¢ cient intertemporal risk
sharing in our model.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Let 0 denote the set on the right side of the equation we need to show to hold.
We rst show   0. There does not exist V 2  such that V < u(0)   (a) +
v(0), since the worker can always choose to exert the lowest e¤ort a regardless of
the contract o¤ered, and he is guaranteed expected utility v(0) next period. It is also
obvious that there exists no V 2  such that V  u(1)  (a) + Vmax.
Next, we show 0 is self-generating and hence 0  .
For all V 2 0 with V < (1 + )[u(1)   (a)] + ()2Vmax(< u(1)   (a) +
Vmax), let

(V ) = , a(V ) = a, ci(V ) = x(V ); and Vi(V ) = y(V )
where x(V ) 2 R+ and y(V ) 2 [v(0); u(1) (a)+Vmax)  0 are chosen to satisfy
V = u(x(V ))  (a) + y(V ):
Obviously, such (
(V ); a(V ); ci(V ); Vi(V )) is feasible, satises (6)-(9), (11), (12), and
Vi(V ) 2 
(V ) 8i 2 
(V ), and therefore generates V .
Next, for all V 2 0 with V  (1 + )[u(1)  (a)] + ()2Vmax, let

(V ) = ;, a(V ) = a, ci(V ) = x(V ) and Vi(V ) = v(s(V ))
where x(V ); s(V ) 2 R+ are chosen to satisfy
V = u(x(V ))  (a) + v(s(V )):
We now show that this is feasible to do. Observe rst that
u(0)  (a) + Vmax < (1 + )[u(1)  (a)] + ()2Vmax:
This is directly implied by Assumption 1. Let
  (1 + )[u(1)  (a)] + ()2Vmax  [u(0)  (a) + Vmax] > 0:
Now for a xed V 2 [(1 + )[u(1)  (a)] + ()2Vmax; u(1)  (a) + Vmax],
let s(V ) = Vmax   0:5  . Since u() is continuous, we can then choose x(V )  0
so that the above equation is satised. Last, it is easy to see that the so chosen
(
(V ); a(V ); ci(V ); Vi(V )) satises (6)-(9), (11), (12), and Vi(V ) 2 
(V ) 8i 2 
(V ),
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and therefore generates V . The proposition is proved.
2.7.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
For any s 2 SA, if v(s) is well dened, then the solution to the bargaining problem
(113) exists and is unique.
We assume that he value function U :  ! R is continuous and concave. This
assumption is reasonable, for the continuity and concavity of U could always be
obtained through randomization over employment contracts if necessary. See Athey
and Bagwell (2001).
Let s 2 SA. We show that the solution to the following optimization problem
exists and is unique:
maxO(V ) s:t: V 2 ; V  Vn(s); U(V ) + s  U  0
where
O(V )  (U(V ) + s  U)!(V   Vn(s))1 !:
We rst prove existence. Notice rst that the constraint V 2  is not binding. To
show this, notice Vn(s)  Vn(0), then use the observation
Vn(0) = u(0)  (0) + v(0):
Notice next that since U(V ) !  1 as V ! Vmax, the constraint V  Vn(s) can
be replaced by Vn(s)  V M for some su¢ ciently large M .
Since U(V ) is continuous, we have that the constraint set, which can now be
written as fV 2 R : Vn(s)  V  M; U(V ) + s   U  0g, is closed and bounded,
and hence compact. Since the objective function O(V ) is continuous, a solution exists.
We now prove uniqueness. This takes 5 steps.
(i) Notice rst that V is not optimal if V < V , where V  is dened in equation
(??). To show this, suppose V 2 V . Then V 0 = V +  could make both the rm and
the worker strictly better o¤, for a positive but su¢ ciently small ; a contradiction.
(ii) Notice next that since U(V ) is concave by Assumption 2, U(V ) and hence
U(V ) + s   U are strictly decreasing over [V ; v(1)=(1   )). Since s 2 SA
requires U(V )+ s  U  0, the equation U(V )+ s  U = 0 has a unique solution.
Denote it V (s). This allows us to rewrite the constraint U(V ) + s  U as
V  V (s):
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(iii) Notice next then
V 2 fV 0 2 R : Vn(s)  V 0 M; U(V 0) + s  U  0g
if and only if
Vn(s)  V  V (s);
where it must hold that Vn(s)  V (s) since the feasibility set cannot be empty. Now
suppose Vn(s) = V (s): Then of course there is a unique solution that maximizes O(V ).
In the following we show that the solution to the bargaining problem is unique also
in the case Vn(s) < V (s):
(iv) So suppose Vn(s) < V (s): Notice rst that a solution must satisfy either
V = Vn(s) or V = V (s), or O0(V ) = 0.
Notice that V = Vn(s) cannot be optimal, because V 0 = Vn(s) +  with  positive
but su¢ ciently small can attain O(V 0) > 0 = O(V ). (Note it doesnt matter whether
Vn(s)  V  or otherwise.)
Notice that V = V (s) cannot be optimal either, because V 0 = Vn(s)    with 
positive but su¢ ciently small can attain O(V 0) > 0 = O(V ).
Therefore, any solution V must satisfy O0(V ) = 0, or
 U 0(V ) V   Vn(s)
U(V ) + s  U =
1  !
!
:
(v) Observe rst that in order to have a solution, it must hold that U 0(V ) < 0,
otherwise the left hand side of the equation is non-positive while the right hand
side is strictly positive. Thus, we need only consider the set of V s over which the
value function U(V ) is strictly decreasing. Given that U(V ) is concave, this in turn
implies that the left hand side is strictly increasing in V over the set of V s that could
potentially solve the problem. It then follows that there at most one V = Vm(s).
To conclude the proof of the lemma, note that we have proved (ii) under the
assumption that the value function U is di¤erentiable. A proof that does not rely on
the di¤erentiability of U is available upon request.
Under Assumption 2, 0 2 SA.
Suppose 0 62 SA. That is, suppose 0 2 SI . Then v(0) = Vn(0) = Vmin = u(0) (0)1  .
Now consider the following contract: it is 0 for the rst period, and then the worker
is given s = 0 to leave the rm. This contract delivers an expected utility equal to
V0+ v(0) to the worker. Clearly V0+ v(0)  Vn(0) and V0+ v(0) 2 . This
contract gives an expected prot equal to (V0)+U to rm. Now U(V0+v(0)) 
(V0) + U  U . So s = 0 2 SA. A contraction.
Suppose the function v is well dened and continuous. Then (i) Vn is a well dened,
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continuous, and strictly increasing function on R+; (ii) Vm is well dened, continuous,
and increasing on SA; and (iii) v is strictly increasing on R+.
Let v be well dened and continuous. Let s2 > s1  0.
(i) That Vn(s) is well dened and continuous is because the objective function is
continuous the constraint correspondence is compact. Use then the theorem of the
maximum. To show that Vn(s) is strictly increasing in s, notice that with s2, the
worker can always choose to have strictly more consumption in the current period
while setting his future assets equal to that with s1.
(ii) We show that the function Vm(s) is also continuous. This is the case because:
(a) The objective function in (113) is continuous in V . (b) Given U(V ) !  1 as
V ! Vmax, there is some M > 0 su¢ ciently large such that for each s 2 SA, the
constraint V  Vn(s) can be replaced by Vn(s)  V  M . This implies a constraint
correspondence that is compact valued and continuous. (c) Apply the theorem of the
maximum.
We next show that Vm is an increasing function. Observe rst that given U 0(V ) < 0
at the optimal V , and Vn(s) is increasing in s, the left hand side of (??) is strictly
decreasing in s. Remember we have already shown that the left hand side of (??) is
increasing in V . So Vm(s) must be increasing in s.
(iii) If s1; s2 2 SA or s1; s2 2 SI , then v(s2)  v(s1) follows directly right from (i)
and (ii). Suppose s1 2 SI but s2 2 SA. Then
v(s2) = Vm(s2) + (1  )Vn(s2)  Vn(s2)  Vn(s1) = v(s1):
Suppose s1 2 SA but s2 2 SI . Suppose v(s1) > v(s2). Then
Vm(s1) + (1  )Vn(s1)  Vn(s2);
which in turn implies Vm(s1)  Vn(s2). This contradicts s1 2 SI since
U(Vm(s1)) + s2   U > U(Vm(s1)) + s1   U  0:
Finally, since  < 1, v is strictly increasing on R+. This proves the lemma.
With the above lemmas, we now proceed to prove the proposition.
1. Let (Y; d) denote the space of all bounded and continuous functions f : R+ ! X
under the sup norm, denoted d. (Note that boundedness is needed for R+ is not
compact.) Y is a complete normed vector space.
2. Dene a mapping   as follows:
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8v 2 Y and s 2 R+,  (v)(s) =
(
Vm(s) + (1  )Vn(s) , if s 2 SA
Vn(s) , if s 2 SI
subject to (110)-(113).
Notice that given Lemma 6, the function  (v) is well dened for all v 2 Y .
3. We show that   maps from Y to Y , that is,   : Y ! Y . We must show that  
preserves boundedness and continuity. That   preserves boundedness is obvious. We
now show that   preserves continuity. Let v 2 Y .
(3a) From Lemma 5, we know that the function Vn(s) is continuous and strictly
increasing on R+. We also know that the function Vm(s) is continuous and increasing
on SA.
(3b) Observe that SI is an open set in R+ and hence SA is closed. To show this,
let s 2 SI . Since 0 2 SA by Lemma 4, we have s > 0. This implies U(V )+s U < 0
for all V 2  such that V  Vn(s). Given the continuity of U and Vn, there exists
" > 0 such that (s  "; s+ ")  SI .
(3c) Since SI 2 R+ is open, it can be written as an union of disjoint open intervals
in R+.
(3d) Observe next that [0; (Vn) 1(V )]  SA. This is because : U  U(V ) by
equation (22), the value function U(V ) is concave by Assumption 2, and the function
Vn(s) is continuous and strictly increasing by Lemma 5.
(3e) With (3c) and (3d), there exists a vector fb0; ai; bi; i = 1; 2; :::;mg  R+ such
that
SA = [0; b0] [

mS
i=1
[ai; bi]

where
(Vn)
 1(V )  b0 < a1  b1 <    < am  bm
and the values of m and bm may be innity.
(3f) Clearly,  (v) is continuous on R+fb0; a1; b1;   ; am; bmg. So,  (v) is contin-
uous on R+ if and only if Vm(s) = Vn(s) for s 2 fb0; a1; b1;   ; am; bmg.
Suppose Vm(bi) > Vn(bi)  V  for i 2 f0; 1;   ;mg, Since Vn is continuous, there
exists " > 0 such that [bi; bi + ")  SA, a contradiction.
Suppose Vm(ai) > Vn(ai)  V  for i 2 f1;   ;mg. since Vn(ai) > V , U is strictly
decreasing for V  V . This implies that U(Vn(ai))+ai U > 0. There exists " > 0
such that (ai   "; ai]  Sa which is a contradiction.
We have proved that the function  (v) is continuous.
4. We show that the mapping   is a contraction. Since the underlying space is a
normed vector space of bounded and continuous functions, we need only verify that
the Blackwell su¢ cient conditions are satised.
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(Monotonicity) Let v1; v2 2 Y and v1  v2. We must show that  (v1)(s)   (v2)(s)
for all s 2 R+.
Let SiA, S
i
B, V
i
n, V
i
m (i = 1; 2) denote the sets SA and SB and the functions Vn and
Vm induced by vi through (110)-(113). Notice rst that V 1n  V 2n .
(i) Suppose s 2 S1A \ S2A. Then the property of the CES objective function guar-
antees that V 1m(s)  V 2m(s), and hence  (v1)(s)   (v2)(s).
(ii) Suppose s 2 S1I \ S2A. We need only show V 1n (s)  V 2m(s), which holds, for
otherwise s 2 S1A.
(iii) Suppose s 2 S1I \ S2I . In this case  (v1)(s) = V 1n (s)  V 2n (s) =  (v2)(s):
(iv) Suppose s 2 S1A \ S2I . In this case, V 1m(s)  V 1n (s)  V 2n (s), implying s 2 S2A,
a contradiction. So s 2 S1A \ S2I cannot be the case.
We therefore have shown that the mapping   is monotonic.
(Discounting) Let v1; v2 2 Y and let v2 = v1 + a for any a > 0. We show that
 (v2)(s)   (v1)(s) + a for all s 2 R+.
Observe rst that V 2n (s) = V
1
n (s) + a for all s 2 R+.
Consider rst the case s 2 S1A \ S2A. The desired result in the case holds trivially
if the maximized Nash product is zero. In the following, we consider the case where
the maximized Nash product is strictly positive.
Let
'i =  
1  !
!
U(V im(s)) + s  U
V im(s)  V in(s)
; i = 1; 2;
where 'i for i = 1; 2 is the slope of the value function U(V ) at optimum, i.e., at
V = V im(s):
Given the concavity of U and the di¤erentiability of indi¤erence curve, U has to
be under the following straight lines
fi(x) = 'i(x  V im(s)) + U(V im(s)); i = 1; 2
Suppose V 2m(s) > V
1
m(s) + a. Then '1 < '2 < 0. Therefore,
U(V 2m(s))  f1((V 2m(s)))) U(V 1m(s)) > f2((V 1m(s)));
a contradiction. So, we conclude that V 2m(s)  V 1m(s) + a.
The cases s 2 S1A S2A, s 2 S2A S1A, and the case s =2 S1A[S2A are straightforward
to analyze and are left for the reader. This proves that the mapping   has the
discounting property and hence we have shown that   is a contraction.
5. By the contraction mapping theorem then, v 2 Y and is the unique xed point
of  . So v is continuous and the proposition is proved.
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2.7.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Suppose i 2 
 but U(Vi) < U   v 1(Vi), then move i from 
 to 
0 while not changing
the values of a, ci and Vi. The modied contract would remain feasible, but the rms
value is strictly increased. On the other hand, suppose U(Vi) > U v 1(Vi) but i 62 
.
Then move i from 
0 to 
 to increase the rms value. The proposition is proven.
2.7.4 Proof of Proposition 2.4
That the worker is terminated with expected utility V implies
U(V ) < U   v 1(V ):
Now this worker would go immediately to the market to look for a new match if and
only if
9 V 0  Vn(v 1(V )) such that U(V 0) + v 1(V )  U:
But this implies the existence of Vm(v 1(V )) and it holds that Vm(v 1(V ))  V . Let
V 0 = Vm(v 1(V )). Then
U(V 0) + v 1(V )  U:
Suppose U = 0. Hence, U(V 0) > U(V ). The proposition is proven.
2.7.5 Proof of Proposition 2.5
We rst show that with the equilibrium contract where U = 0, it holds that
b
  SA:
This is easy to show. For each v 1(V ) 2 b
, we have (i) V 2 [v(0); Vmax)  ;
(ii) V = v(v 1(V ))  Vn(v 1(V )); and (iii) U(V ) + v 1(V )  0. So v 1(V ) 2 SA.
Remark: The fact that U = 0 is important for part (iii) of the proof.
Next, we show b
A  SA:
To show this, let s = 0 and V = V 2 . Clearly, V  Vn(0) and U(V) + 0  U by
(23). Remark: the equilibrium condition U = 0 is not needed in the proof here.
Last, with the equilibrium contract with U = 0, it holds that
b
I  SI :
This is a corollary of Proposition 2.4 which says that if s 2 b
 then s 62 SA and hence
s 2 SI . The proposition is proven.
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2.7.6 Proof of Proposition 2.6
We prove the rst part of the proposition by way of contradiction. Suppose otherwise.
Then there exists a strictly monotonic sequence fsqg such that sq 2 SI for all q, and
sq ! 0 as q !1.
Next we show that it must hold that Vn(sq)! 0 as q !1. Since sq 2 SI 8q,
v(sq) = Vn(sq) = max
0csq
fu(c)  (0) + v[(1 + r)(sq   c)=]g:
Let q ! 0 on both sides of the above equation to obtain
u(0)  (0) + v(0) = v(0)
or
v(0) = [u(0)  (0)]=(1 + ) = 0:
So Vn(sq)! v(0) = 0 as q !1.
Now for each q and sq, consider the following contract for the unemployed worker
with assets sq. The worker is employed for one period. For the period the worker
is employed, his compensation is determined by 0. The worker is then terminated
with assets s. So the workers utility under this contract is H0+v(sq). For q large
enough, it must then hold that
H0 + v(sq)  (1  )Vn(sq) + Vn(sq) = Vn(sq):
This holds because (a) sq 2 SI so v(sq) = Vn(sq); (b) H0 > 0; and (c) Vn(sq) ! 0 as
q !1.
Finally, notice that for q large enough, it holds that
(H0) + sq   sq + U > U:
Thus we have shown sq 2 SA for q large enough. A contradiction. This proves the
rst part of the proposition.
We now prove the second part of the proposition. We know that 0 2 SA. Let
s  minfs 2 SIg. Given that v() is continuous, it must hold that
Vn(s) = Vm(s) + (1  Vn(s);
or
Vn(s) = Vm(s):
102
It then must hold that
U(Vn(s)) + s = U = 0::
Let f(s)  U(Vn(0)) + s for all s  0. Observe rst that
f(0) = U(Vn(0)) + 0 = U(V
) > 0;
where V  > Vn(0). Observe next that over the interval [0; v 1(V )], f(s) is strictly
monotone increasing in s, for Vn(s) is strictly increasing in s at all s and U(V ) is
strictly increasing in V over the interval [Vn(0); V ]. Therefore a solution (??) cannot
exist over the interval [0; v 1(V )]. That is
s > v 1(V ):
This proves the proposition.
2.7.7 Proof of Proposition 2.7
We need only show that there exists V > v(0) such that
U(V )  U   v 1(V ); 8V > V :
In turn, we need only show that there exist functions U^() and C() such that for V
su¢ ciently large, it holds that
U(V )  U^(V )  U   C(V )  U   v 1(V ):
We now construct the functions U^() and C(). First, set for each V  v(0);
C(V )  u
 1[(1  )V ]
1   :
C(V ) is the cost to the rm of terminating a worker who is not to participate in the
labor market in the rest of his life, so it must hold that C(V )  v 1(V ) for all V .
Next, for each V  v(0), dene U^(V ) as follows. Imagine a rm who currently
employs a worker with expected utility V at the beginning of a period. Suppose this
worker is not subject to moral hazard. That is, when this worker is employed by
the rm, his e¤orts are perfectly observable to the rm so the the rm can make
the workers compensation contingent on the workers e¤orts. With his worker, the
optimal termination strategy for the rm is to either never terminate the worker until
he dies, or terminate him after one period.
Consider rst the case where the worker is never terminated. In this case, the
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worker is given a constant compensation say c and he is asked to make a constant
e¤ort say a, where c and a satisfy
V =
u(c)  (a)
1   :
Since a  a,
c  u 1((1  )V + (a)):
In this case then the value of the rm is less than or equal to
U^1(V )     u
 1((1  )V + (a))
1   :
Consider next the case in which the worker is terminated after one period. Con-
sider the best possible scenario for the rm where, after termination, the worker is
employed every period by some other rm which gives the worker all the surplus of
the match so the workers current employer can incur the least possible cost of ter-
mination. Suppose this translates into a constant compensation of c with a constant
level of e¤ort a  a > 0 for the worker after termination. Now let a1 denote optimal
e¤ort in the rst period. Let c1 denote the optimal compensation for the worker in the
rst period, and c2 the optimal compensation in each period after the termination.
Then
V = u(c1)  (a1) + 
1  [u(c2 + c)  (a)]:
To minimize cost, the rm sets c1 = c2 + c, and hence
V + (a1) +

1  (a) =
u(c2 + c)
1   ;
and so
c2 = u
 1[(1  )(V + (a1)) + (a)]  c:
The value of the rm in this case is therefore equal to
   (c2 + c)  
1  c2
=    c  u
 1[(1  )(V + (a1)) + (a)]  c
1  
    
1  c 
u 1[(1  )V + (a)]
1  
 U^2(V ) (117)
Let U^(V ) = maxfU^1(V ); U^2(V )g for all V . It is easy to see that U^1(V ) > U^2(V ),
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so U^(V ) = U^1(V ). Therefore equation (??) holds if and only if
   u 1((1  )V + (a))
1    U  
u 1((1  )V )
1   :
or
   (1  )U  u 1[(1  )V + (a)]  u 1[(1  )V ]:
This proves the proposition.
2.7.8 Proof of Proposition 2.8
Let s = maxs2SA s, which is well dened since SA is compact. Consider the optimiza-
tion problem faced by a non-employed worker with asset s > s,
max
c0;t2f1;2;g[f1g;s0

1  kt
1  k [u(c)  (0)] + k
tv(s0)

subject to
1  kt
1  k c+ k
ts0 = s
s0 2 SA
where k =  = 
1+r
< 1.
Note that if t = 1, then kt = 0, and the choice of s0 is not relevant. Note that
it is optimal to make consumption constant across the periods before reentering the
labor market with asset s0 2 SA at the period t+1. The case t =1 is the case where
the worker consumes the annuity of his/her asset every period and never comes back
to the labor market.
For the purpose of this proof, we can replace the constraint t 2 f1; 2;   g [ f1g
in the optimization problem above by t 2 R+ [ f1g. Observe next that it is optimal
to have s0 = s, by the denition of the function v().
Let the rst derivative of the objective function with respect to t be denoted
H(s; t),
H(s; t) kt ln k
 
u[ 1 k
1 kt (s  kts)]  (0)
1  k   v(s) 
s  s
1  ktu
0[
1  k
1  kt (s  k
ts)]
!
 kt ln kF (s; t):
Notice rst that  kt ln k > 0 for all t 2 R+. Notice next that F (s; t) a strictly
decreasing in t since its partial derivative with respect to t is
 (1  k)k
t ln k(s  s)2
(1  kt)3 u
00

1  k
1  kt (s  k
ts)

< 0
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and goes to
L(s; s) =
u[(1  k)s]  (0)
1  k   v(s)  (s  s)u
0[(1  k)s]
as t goes to innity. Last, observe that
F (s; 0) =
u(1)  (0)
1  k   v(s) > 0:
The above observations imply that t =1 is optimal if and only if L(s; s)  0.
So consider the function L. Observe rst that
L(s; s) =
u[(1  k)s]  (0)
1  k   v(s)  0;
where the inequality follows from the denition of the function v(). Next, notice
L1(s; s) =  (1  k)(s  s)u00[(1  k)s] > 0:
Third, notice
lim
s!1
L(s; s) = Vmax   v(s) > 0
which holds because lim
s!1
(s  s)u0[(1  k)s] = 0 given u() is bounded.
With the above observations, we conclude that L(s)  0 if and only if s  s
where s solves
L(s; s) = 0;
and s > s. The proposition is proved.
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